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We analyze empirically the impact of urban agglomeration on Italian wages. Using 
micro-data from the Bank of Italy's Survey of Household Income and Wealth for the years 
1995, 1998, 2000 and 2002 on more than 22,000 employees distributed in 242 randomly 
drawn local labor markets (30 percent of the total), we test whether the structure of wages 
varies with urban scale. We find that every additional 100 employees per square kilometer 
(100,000 inhabitants) in the local labor market raises earnings by 0.4-0.6 percent (0.1 
percent) and that employees working in large cities earn, on average, 2-3 percent higher 
wages than those in the rest of the economy. The application of spatial data analysis 
techniques enables us to state that this effect is present only in the large cities surrounded by 
low-populated areas. We also find that urbanization does not affect returns to experience and 
that it reduces returns to education and to tenure with current firm, while providing a 
premium to managers, worker supervisors, and office workers. 
JEL classification: R12, J31. 
Keywords: Wage Differentials, Urbanization, Agglomeration Externalities, Population 




                                                           
* Bank of Italy, Sede di Roma, Economic Research Unit.  
** University of Rome “La Sapienza”.  
     
Contents 
 
1. Introduction......................................................................................................................... 7 
2. Overview of the previous literature................................................................................... 11 
3. The empirical strategy....................................................................................................... 17 
3.1  The data set................................................................................................................. 17 
3.2  The large-city threshold.............................................................................................. 19 
4. Descriptive statistics.......................................................................................................... 21 
5. The estimation results........................................................................................................ 24 
5.1  Urban wage premia .................................................................................................... 25 
5.1.1 Robustness checks ............................................................................................ 30 
5.2  The urban wage structure........................................................................................... 32 
6. Concluding remarks........................................................................................................... 36 
Tables and figures……………………………………………………....... ………………...39 
Appendix I: the Moran scatterplot and the local Moran’s I  statistic..................................... 55 
Appendix II: the spatial association scheme ......................................................................... 57 
References ............................................................................................................................. 59   
1.  Introduction
1 
While the evidence on the magnitude of the labor-productivity gains generated by 
agglomeration is fairly consistent across countries, the findings on the extent to which these 
gains accrue to workers show considerable variation. Thus, while the elasticity of average 
labor productivity with respect to employment density is estimated to be 5 percent in the US 
and 4.5 percent in Italy, France, Germany, Spain and the UK (with no significant difference 
across countries; Ciccone (2002) and Ciccone and Hall, 1996),
2 the estimates of urban wage 
premia vary widely both across and within countries, depending on the agglomeration 
variable and dataset used. For instance, the elasticity of wages is about 2 percent large with 
respect to employment density in the French zones de emploi (Combes, Duranton, Gobillon, 
2003); it is 2.7 percent with respect to US Statistical Metropolitan Area (SMA) population 
level (Wheeler, 2001); and it amounts to 10 percent when it is calculated with respect to the 
Japanese Standard Metropolitan Employment Area population (Tabuchi and Yoshida, 
2000).
3 
Furthermore, while Diamond and Simon (1990) find that every additional 1 million 
inhabitants in the US SMAs increases wages by 1-2 percent, Glaeser and Maré (2001) obtain 
that in the large US cities earnings are 24-28 percent higher than in rural areas (the premium 
falls to 13-19 percent in small towns).
4 Even though these last authors find that returns to 
                                                           
1 We thank William Strange for having spurred us to undertake this work, Erich Battistin, Simon Burgess, 
Luigi Cannari, Mary Gregory, Stefano Iezzi, Geeta Kingdon, Andrea Lamorgese, Claudio Lucifora, Margaret 
Stevens and an anonymous referee for helpful suggestions and comments, and Carla Bertozzi for valuable 
research assistance. We also thank the participants to the Third Labor Economics Workshop “Brucchi 
Luchino” (10-11
th December 2004, Florence) and those of the Italian Congress of Econometrics and Empirical 
Economics (24-25
th January 2005, Venice) for stimulating discussions. The views expressed herein are those of 
the authors and not necessarily those of the Bank of Italy. Authors’ e-mail address: 
sabrina.diaddario@bancaditalia.it; eleonora.patacchini@uniroma1.it. 
2 Of course, the differences in productivity can be much larger when comparing specific cities. For instance, 
New York county’s workers are 22 percent more productive than those in the state with the highest average 
productivity (i.e., New York State; Ciccone and Hall, 1996).  
3 In real terms, the elasticity is negative (between –12 and –7 percent; Tabuchi and Yoshida, 2000). 
4 Large cities are the SMAs containing at least one municipality with more than 500,000 inhabitants, and 
small cities are the rest of the SMAs.      8
experience (and to college education) increase with urbanization,
5 part of the average 
premium from rural-into-metropolitan areas migration is received within the first year after 
moving. However, after controlling for individual-specific effects the wage premium from 
moving between metropolitan and non-metropolitan areas is reduced to about 4.5 percent.
6 
Finally, Rosenthal and Strange (2005) measure the geographic scope of agglomeration 
economies by testing wage differentials between concentric rings with rays of variable 
length centered around each worker, and find that wages increase by 1.8 percent for every 
additional 100,000 full-time workers within 5 miles (even though the premium disappears 
after controlling for self-selection in the densest markets). 
Among the possible reasons for the great variation in the agglomeration-effect 
estimates across studies are the different territorial unit of analysis used (also because 
externalities attenuate rapidly across space) and unmeasured differences in the spatial 
distribution of the population. Thus, in contrast to the majority of studies, in this paper we 
use a wide set of agglomeration indicators, and we adopt spatial data analysis techniques 
(i.e., the Moran Scatterplot and the Local Moran’s I Statistics of Spatial Correlation - see 
Section 3) to identify the threshold values defining large cities. This methodology is 
particularly interesting because it enables us to distinguish the effect of living in a large city 
surrounded by low-populated areas (HL) from that of living in a large city surrounded by 
highly populated areas (HH). Indeed, according to Ciccone’s and Hall’s (1996) model, a 
higher dispersion of employment densities across counties increases productivity, provided 
that agglomeration effects outweigh congestion effects. To give a quantitative example, the 
authors find that New York State’s productivity would be 19 percent lower if employment 
was re-allocated uniformly within its counties.  
                                                           
5 In this paper we use the term urbanization as a synonymous of urban agglomeration, and the term 
localization to broadly mean industrial agglomeration (similarly to Rosenthal and Strange (2004), who take the 
former to represent the economies arising from the city itself, and the latter as the externalities from the spatial 
concentration of activity within a certain industry). Other authors, however, take the former (or Jacobs 
externalities) to mean product variety or inter-industry size, and the latter (or Marshall-Arrow-Romer or MAR 
externalities) to mean “sectoral specialization” or industry size. 
6 Besides individual characteristics, individual fixed effects include a person-specific wage-intercept term. 
Note that all these findings are quite sensitive to the dataset used. For instance, when using the PSID instead of 
the NLSY, return-to-education differentials disappear and so do premia from rural-to-metropolitan area 
migration (the latter appear again only after the first three years).     9
Using a unique dataset of more than 22,000 employees distributed in 242 randomly 
drawn local labor markets (30 percent of the total) from the Bank of Italy’s Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth (SHIW) for the four available years between 1995 and 2002, 
we find that in Italy earnings rise by 0.4-0.6 percent for each additional 100 employees per 
square kilometer and by just 0.1 percent for every 100,000-inhabitant increase in the LLM. 
We also obtain that wages are 2-3 percent higher in large cities than elsewhere, and that this 
premium is exclusively present in the HL-cities, implying that not only the levels, but also 
the degree of inequality of the population distribution across LLMs matters in determining 
agglomeration effects. However, the large-city premium disappears when we also add 
employment density, which, on the contrary, raises earnings by 0.3-0.5 percent for each 100 
employees per square kilometer increase. Somewhat surprisingly, we also find that college 
graduates prefer living in large cities in spite of earning 7 percent less there than elsewhere.
7 
This apparent puzzle could be explained by the presence of heterogeneous preferences 
(though we cannot directly test this hypothesis). Indeed, it could be the case that, in contrast 
to the large-city employees with a middle school or a secondary school attainment (who do 
not suffer nor benefit from wage differentials with respect to their non-urban counterparts), 
college graduates have preferences for urban consumption amenities strong enough to 
compensate their wage loss. In general, we find that urbanization does not create monetary 
incentives to invest in human capital, but “rewards” job qualification. In particular, while 
urban agglomeration does not affect returns to experience, each additional 100 employees 
per square kilometer reduces returns to seniority by 0.1 percent, and raises managers’ 
earnings by 1.8-2.1 percent. 
While it is now widely recognised that urbanization is an important determinant of 
average labour productivity, and thus of average wages, its impact on the determinants of 
earnings is less frequently investigated (and, to our knowledge, it has never been on Italian 
data). The absence of empirical work on this subject is rather surprising, not only for the 
interest of the subject per se, but also because omitting a measure of city size (when it is 
significant) would systematically bias all the monetary-return estimates of any variable 
                                                           
7 Of course, in real terms the income loss is likely to be greater, as the cost of living is normally higher in 
the largest cities than in the rest of the economy.     10
correlated to workers’ location. In Italy, for instance, omitting city size would cause returns 
to college degree to be overestimated by 1.3 percent, since one third of college graduates 
lives in a large city (see Section 4). The magnitude of this bias reaches 36 percent in the US 
(Black, Kolesnikova and Taylor, 2005), probably because of the higher wage flexibility. 
These findings raise a number of policy-relevant issues. First, to what extent does the 
spatial dispersion of the Italian population constitute an obstacle to growth? On the basis of 
various empirical studies, Rosenthal and Strange (2004) report that doubling city size 
increases productivity by 3-8 percent. The fact that we find a lower wage premium could 
indicate that Italian cities are under-sized, which, according to Au and Henderson (2004), 
would produce a higher loss of real output per worker than over-size. More research needs to 
be done on whether it would be desirable or possible to adopt measures to increase the 
dimension of Italian cities. Second, to what extent will productivity growth eventually be 
hampered by the presence of negative return-to-education differentials in the Italian large 
cities? According to Glaeser and Saiz (2003) the most important determinant of urban 
growth is skill composition. In the last twenty years, the US SMAs with a higher share of 
educated workers have grown 3.4 times faster than those with a lower proportion of college 
graduates. More generally, the rising level of educational attainment contributed to almost 
one-third of US output-per-hour growth (over the period 1950-1993; Jones, 2002). While 
currently Italian cities do attract highly educated workers, it is legitimate to wonder whether 
the presence of negative urban wage differentials to college graduates will eventually lower 
their demand for cities (see Glaeser, 1999) and will thus diminish Italy’s productivity growth 
in the long run.
8 Finally, if the most highly educated Italian workers concentrate in large 
cities in spite of obtaining lower returns, there must either be consumption amenities that 
compensate their wage loss or a higher demand of their skills (i.e., a higher probability of 
finding a job). In the former case, in order to keep attracting high skilled workers city-
planners should aim at improving the quality and at increasing the offer of city services 
                                                           
8 Becker, Ichino and Peri (2003) find that while other large economies have been experiencing a “brain 
exchange” (both importing and exporting highly educated workers), Italy is the only country of the European 
Union to experience a “brain drain”, large in size and increasing over time. It would be interesting to 
understand the extent to which this phenomenon can be explained (besides, perhaps, an imperfect recruitment 
system) by negative college graduate return-to-education differentials in the largest cities (which is where the 
most highly educated people like to live).     11
(schools, transportation system, hospitals, etc.). In the latter case, local governments should 
rather ease regulations, cut business taxes and provide subsidies to attract firms (Adamson, 
Clark and Partridge, 2004).  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes previous 
results from the literature. Section 3 describes the dataset and the agglomeration variables, 
including the spatial statistics techniques used to determine the large-city thresholds. Section 
4 presents the main features of workers and firms in the most highly populated Italian LLMs 
and describes our sample’s main statistics. Section 5 investigates the existence and 
magnitude of urban wage premia and compares the wage structure in large cities to that in 
the rest of the economy. Section 6 concludes.  
2.  Overview of the previous literature 
Why should wages be affected by urban agglomeration? 
According to the agglomeration literature, in order to exist cities must benefit from 
local increasing returns or indivisibilities; in order not to explode, they must suffer from 
some sort of congestion cost. Urban wage premia could be the outcome of either local 
increasing returns or congestion.
9 In the former case, earnings grow with urban 
agglomeration because of labor productivity gains. In the latter case, urban wage premia are 
a compensation that workers receive for bearing a lower quality of life in more congested 
areas. 
Labor productivity gains are mainly generated by (Marshallian or Jacobian) external 
scale economies arising from the nearby location of similar firms and specialized workers; 
they can be of four types. First are economies resulting from intra-industry specialization due 
to a finer inter-firm division of labor, increasing the number of industrial linkages (including 
with the service sector). Second are economies due to the cost reductions that result from 
producers’ physical proximity to input suppliers and/or final consumers. Third are     12
externalities due to the greater intensity of communication between agents, which generates 
knowledge spillovers favoring innovation (technological spillovers) and increasing the speed 
of learning (intellectual spillovers). Fourth are economies arising from the existence of 
pooled markets for specialized workers with industry-specific skills (labor pooling), which 
reduce the mismatch between workers’ skills and firm’s job requirements.
10 
Wages could be also affected by the fact that agglomeration leads to more intense 
competition, which on the one hand raises producers’ or workers’ productivity,
11 but on the 
other hand, might force employees to work “too long” hours in order to signal effort, which 
could reduce productivity because of diminishing marginal returns (Rosenthal and Strange, 
2002). Moreover, in a context of monopsony power,
12 more intense competition may 
produce wage premia even in the absence of productivity gains, as the greater risk of having 
their specialized workers poached by competitors might force firms to renounce part of their 
labor market power - embodying transferable knowledge (see, for instance, Combes and 
Duranton, 2001). 
In the quality-of-life framework, urban wage premia can exist in the absence of labor 
productivity gains. In this type of compensating-differential model (see Gyourko, Kahn and 
Tracy (1999) for a review), workers have a preference for amenities (indivisible 
consumption or public goods) that are profitable to supply only in the largest cities (e.g., 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
9 Note that there might also be institutional reasons for earnings to be higher in large cities (i.e., urban 
allowances), but these can be seen as a compensation from local governments for the higher congestion costs. 
10 In this framework, the presence of frictions in the economy lowers the output of matches, equal to the 
productivity from the perfect match minus the loss from the mismatch between jobs and skills. In Helsely’s and 
Strange’s (1990) model, for instance, the expected quality of matches, and thus productivity and wages, 
increase with the number of firms locating in the city. In Kim (1990), specialization, increasing with the 
number of workers in the market, improves the average match, reducing the costs that firms have to incur to 
train the mismatched employees. Note that in the labor-pooling context, agglomeration may increase wages not 
only by lowering training costs, but also by reducing firms’ search costs per worker (as in Wheeler, 2001), or 
by facilitating the mobility of unsatisfied employees across firms. 
11 For instance, by increasing firms’ propensity to innovate (Porter, 1990) or by improving the quality of 
matches (by facilitating the mobility of workers across jobs). 
12 In the absence of productivity gains, in order to explain why firms do not flee from the largest cities it is 
necessary to assume the presence of some source of imperfection leading to wages below marginal product (see 
Stevens, 1994). However, when perfect competition is reached the poaching problem disappears. In contrast, 
all the agglomeration effects that enhance productivity could also exist in a context of perfect competition (i.e., 
the requirement being for the bargaining system to be such that at least some of the benefits from higher urban 
labor productivity are capitalized by workers).     13
because of increasing returns in the provision of local public services). Amenities can be 
“productive” (e.g., infrastructures such as airports or public intermediate inputs tailored to 
firms’ specific needs, but also specialized schools and better quality services) or 
“unproductive” for firms.
13 In these models, rents and wages adjust to make individuals 
indifferent between locations (Roback, 1982). Thus, rents increase to ration the demand for 
space in  the  cities endowed with the best amenities (so as to equalize workers’ utility in all 
locations), lowering wages in real terms. In case of unproductive amenities, wages decrease 
in nominal terms as well, so as to equalize firms’ costs across locations (in order to make 
them willing to localize where rents are higher). In the case of productive amenities, rents 
rise by a larger amount, but the net effect on nominal wages depends on the strength of the 
amenity effect on workers relatively to that on firms. Furthermore, as city size rises 
individuals’ utility declines because of congestion disamenities (i.e., longer commuting, 
smaller houses, higher cost of living, pollution).
14 Thus, all else equal, the presence of urban 
wage premia depends on whether workers’ (firms’) disutility from urban disamenities 
exceeds (or falls short of) the utility from favorable amenities.  
Whatever the source of average wage premia, their distribution might be unequal 
across educational, experience and seniority groups.  
For instance, the most educated workers might benefit more than the least educated 
employees from knowledge spillovers, better match quality, or improved quality of life. In 
the first case, the returns to education would increase with urban agglomeration if the latter 
was associated to higher levels of average human capital (see Moretti, 2004) and those 
benefited the most educated individuals more than the less skilled ones (see Benabou, 
1993).
15 The opposite would occur if the least educated workers had a higher learning 
                                                           
13 By “unproductive amenities” we mean those increasing workers’ utility and either lowering or not 
affecting firms’ marginal costs (e.g., clean air, a wider offer of cultural and sport venues or a larger variety of 
shopping centers).  
14 Utility should be first increasing and then decreasing in city size. 
15 However, there might ultimately be decreasing returns to the agglomeration of high skills (Benabou 
(1993); see also Ciccone and Peri, 2000). Note also that in the short term, an imperfect substitution of workers 
with different levels of human capital could reduce returns to education in the most agglomerated areas by 
creating an excess supply of highly educated workers in large cities (see Moretti, 2004), forcing some of the 
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capability (e.g., because they had more to learn; Rosenthal and Strange, 2005). In the second 
case, the returns to education could increase with urban scale if match quality improved 
more for the most educated workers than for the least educated ones. In Wheeler (2001), for 
instance, the density of job seekers in the market on the one hand increases the complexity of 
search, creating a congestion externality; on the other hand, it reduces firms’ search cost per-
worker (by enhancing workers’ arrival rate per job opening, in the presence of fixed search 
costs for advertising and interviewing). Thus, provided that the agglomeration benefits 
outweigh the costs, firms in large cities have a higher reservation quality than elsewhere, and 
high-quality employers, more desirable for all job seekers, select the highest-skill workers. 
This mechanism, while improving the efficiency of matches (as capital and worker’s skill are 
complementary), generates greater between-skill-group wage inequality. Third, in the 
quality-of-life framework the correlation between returns to education and urban 
agglomeration would be positive if the more-educated (or wealthier) people had a stronger 
aversion to living in large cities than the less-educated ones (for instance, because they have 
more to lose from crime; Adamson, Clark and Partridge, 2004); it would be negative if the 
more educated (or wealthier) people were more willing (or capable) to forego part of their 
income in exchange for a higher quality of life in the largest cities (Black, Kolesnikova and 
Taylor, 2005).  
Rosenthal and Strange (2005) find evidence of increasing returns to education in the 
US: after controlling for self-selection, they obtain that college graduates earn 3 percent 
more for each 100,000 worker-increase within 5 miles, while individuals with a lower 
educational attainment do not earn any differently. These effects peak at the 5
th mile, then 
drop to 1/2-1/4 before the 25
th mile and rapidly attenuate afterwards. In Wheeler (2001), a 
doubling of the US SMA population increases hourly wages by 4 percent in the sub-sample 
of the individuals with at least 16 years of schooling (1.3 percent more than for the average 
worker); by 3 percent for those with 13-15 years of education; and by 2 percent (0.7 percent 
less than the average premium) for the sub-sample of workers with 9-12 years of education 
(the less educated workers do not earn any differently). In contrast, after controlling for 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
most skilled workers to fill vacancies requiring lower levels of qualification (which would worsen the quality 
of the average match).      15
employment density Adamson, Clark and Partridge (2004) find evidence of decreasing 
returns to education
16 (a doubling of the population reduces returns to college degree and to 
high school attainment by 3 and 2 percent respectively), implying that urban amenities play 
an important role in the location decisions of the most highly educated workers. The idea 
that the return-to-education differentials due to urban agglomeration derive from differences 
in the endowment of cities’ consumption amenities is supported by Black, Kolesnikova and 
Taylor (2005), who find that in the US returns to education are lower in the high-amenity 
and expensive cities (i.e., San Francisco, Seattle and New York) compared to low-amenity 
towns (e.g., Houston and Pittsburgh).  
Finally, the sign of the correlation between returns to tenure and urban agglomeration 
is also a priori ambiguous. It could be positive for at least two reasons.
17 First, because, in a 
context of imperfect competition, market size could increase the degree to which on-the-job 
training is transferable, and thus the risk poaching (see Stevens, 1994), which forces firms to 
renounce part of their share of the return to training, raising workers’ returns to tenure.
18 
Second, if firms deferred compensation in the form of wages increasing over time as a 
strategic device to raise workers’ productivity, and if this induced the most productive 
workers to stay longer with their current employer, returns to seniority would increase with 
urban scale (as in Topel, 1991). In contrast, if it was the case that the workers with a greater 
tendency to stay with their employers (even when badly matched) were the bad-quality ones 
(as in Stevens, 2003), agglomeration - by increasing the length of tenure - would in fact 
reduce returns to seniority. 
                                                           
16 In relation to this, Ciccone and Peri (2000) find evidence of a negative correlation between private returns 
to education and SMAs’ endowment of human capital in the US. In particular, each one-year increase in 
average schooling reduces individual returns to education by 1.4 percent, while raising average labor 
productivity by 1-11 percent. In contrast, Rosenthal and Strange (2005) find that proximity to high human 
capital increases average wages: exchanging 10,000 low educated workers with the same amount of college 
graduates would increase wages within 5 miles by 4.7 percent for the average full-time worker, and by 11.4 
percent for the employees with a university degree. 
17 In Beffy at al. (2004) the steepness of the wage-tenure curve increases with the arrival rate of job offers. 
This model would predict returns to tenure to increase with urban agglomeration, as the latter should raise 
arrival rates per unit of time. 
18 We are taking returns to tenure to proxy specific returns to training (which is common in the literature). 
In Stevens’ (1994) model, on-the-job training is neither completely specific nor completely general, so that part 
of its return accrues to the worker, part to his/her employer and part to other firms. The model would also 
     16
While there are a number of studies on the differentials in returns to education 
generated by urban agglomeration, there is much less evidence on the differentials in returns 
to experience and we have not found any work specifically addressing returns to tenure. In 
countries with a low horizontal mobility of labor, such as Italy or France, the risk of having 
one’s workers poached is lower than in countries with a high mobility, like the US. Thus, we 
would expect the increase in the return to seniority deriving from the agglomeration-induced 
fear of poaching to be lower in Europe than in the US, as workers tend to stay longer in the 
firm (Beffy at al., 2004). In fact, a longer tenure in large cities with respect to the rest of the 
economy would generate negative differentials in returns to seniority if it regarded bad-
quality workers more than good-quality employees (as in Stevens, 2003). In constrast, if the 
incidence of training was higher among the most educated workers than among the least 
educated employees (see Brunello (2001) for some evidence on Europe), and if urban 
agglomeration increased the supply of highly educated workers (e.g., because of higher 
returns, as in Wheeler, 2001), urbanization would also raise the propensity to train and 
therefore returns to seniority.  
Last, agglomeration may affect also returns to job qualification. According to 
Rosenthal and Strange (2002), the elasticity of wages with respect to employment density in 
the worker’s occupation is higher for professionals than for non-professionals (respectively, 
5.0 against 3.1 percent for 30-40 year-old individuals, and 6.7 against 3.8 percent for middle-
aged workers). Moreover, the more intense rivalry in the largest cities forces young 
professionals to work harder (i.e., longer hours) than in smaller centers,
19 which could 
reduce their wages because of fatigue.  
The Italian literature has typically focused on regional disparities because of the large 
labor-productivity gap between the North and the South of the country (the North-South 
divide). More recent studies have analyzed the impact of industrial agglomeration and have 
found that localization has a depressing effect on the returns to education, while it does not 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
predict less amount of on-the-job training, a higher component of specific (non-transferable) training and lower 
worker turnover (longer tenure) in large cities.  
19 This is in line with Kalwij and Gregory (2004), who find that in the UK hourly wage increases raise 
overtime hours for both men and women. Thus, if agglomeration raises wages it should also increase overtime 
hours.      17
affect average wages, returns to experience or to seniority.
20 The lack of studies on the 
impact of urbanization in Italy is rather surprising, because despite the heterogeneity of the 
literature results, there is now a large consensus on the existence of urban wage differentials. 
The only study using Italian data tackling in part this issue is Cingano’s and Schivardi’s 
(2004), who find that doubling LLM manufacturing employment increases wage growth by 
0.1 percent each year.  
3.  The empirical strategy 
3.1  The data set 
We test the existence of urban wage premia with a Mincerian wage function (Mincer, 
1958) augmented with agglomeration variables. We use data from the biannual Survey of 
Household Income and Wealth, conducted by the Bank of Italy for the years 1995, 1998, 
2000 and 2002. This is the only Italian survey that allows the estimation of individuals’ 
returns to education, as it collects information on schooling besides wages, work experience 
and tenure. We complement this data set with three variables at the local labor market 
(LLM) level from the Labor Force Survey:
21 the employment density, the population size 
and the unemployment rate. 
Our territorial unit of analysis is the LLM. This choice is essentially motivated by 
three reasons. First, LLMs are “self-contained” labor markets, since by definition they are 
characterized by a very high overlap between the residing and the working populations.
22 As 
a consequence, labor mobility between LLMs is very low (OECD, 2002), which minimizes 
the endogeneity issues that may arise when one estimates agglomeration effects (see Section 
                                                           
20 See de Blasio and Di Addario (2005) for a review of the literature and some empirical evidence on wage 
differentials in Italian Industrial Districts.  
21 We match the SHIW and Labor Force Survey data to LLMs with an algorithm provided by the National 
Institute of Statistics on the basis of individuals’ municipality of residence. 
22 The National Institute of Statistics obtains LLMs from the 1991 Population Census on the basis of the 
daily commuting flows from place of residence to place of work (Istat, 1997). The condition determining their 
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5.1.1). Second, LLMs partition the entire national territory, allowing us to draw conclusions 
with general validity (in contrast to case studies). Third, LLMs are increasingly used as the 
territorial unit of analysis in the agglomeration literature (see Rosenthal and Strange (2004) 
for a survey) and are now available in a number of countries (including the UK's Travel-to-
Work Areas and the French zones d'emploi).
23 
How to define and measure urban agglomeration is a matter of investigation in itself. 
In the literature there is not much agreement on which is the best proxy. According to 
Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Ciccone (2002), for instance, employment density captures the 
agglomeration externalities on labor productivity better than city or industry size, while for 
other authors (see, for instance, Moomaw, 1983) population scale is a better proxy for net 
agglomeration economies. Since we think that each of these factors captures some of the 
aspects through which agglomeration might affect wages, we adopt in this paper an agnostic 
view and measure urban agglomeration with a wide set of variables. First, the LLM 
employment density, aimed at capturing enhanced-productivity effects induced by 
agglomeration externalities. Second, the LLM population level, used in the literature to 
measure the impact of urban amenities.
24 Third, because the latter might manifest themselves 
only in the largest cities (as it might be necessary to reach a certain critical mass to make the 
construction of, say, an airport or a specialized school profitable), we control for a large-city 
dummy (see below). Fourth, we also test the effect of a wide set of threshold dummies (i.e., 
the 250000, 300000 and 350000 inhabitant-thresholds; the 75
th and the 90
th-99
th percentiles 
of both the employment density and the population size sample distributions), to increase the 
robusteness of our results. Finally, we argue that the scope of agglomeration economies 
might depend on the country’s population spatial structure. This argument has been first 
suggested by Ciccone and Hall (1996), who show that productivity increases with the degree 
of inequality of the employment density distribution. However, the spatial distribution of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
boundaries requires both that at least three quarters of the LLM residents are employed there and that at least 
three quarters of the LLM employees reside there.  
23 Note that the US Metropolitan Statistical Areas are not directly comparable to LLMs as they are obtained 
with a different methodology (i.e., they must contain an urban center and are singled out on the basis of 
population density as well as commuting conditions).     19
population might also affect the consumption amenities effect. For instance, it could be the 
case that in a country like the US, where large cities are surrounded by large portions of very 
low populated land, the urban amenities effect is more pronounced than in Italy (where the 
distance between cities is much shorter and almost all land is urbanized to some extent; see 
Table 1),
25 because the choice between locating in a large city or in its surroundings may be 
more radical.  
We thus analyze the geographical distribution of the Italian population using recently 
developed techniques of exploratory spatial data analysis (see Anselin (1988) for a review), 
which detect the existence of a spatial structure by testing the presence of spatial 
autocorrelation.
26 In particular, we identify significant groupings of the Italian LLM 
population at the local level wih two complementary tools: the Moran Scatterplot and the 
Local Moran’s I Statistics (Anselin, 1995 and 1996; see Appendix I for a general 
description). 
3.2  The large-city threshold 
The use of the local Moran’s I statistic in conjunction with the Moran Scatterplot 
offers an original tool for the identification of the thresholds defining large cities, and it 
provides, in addition, information on the average population level of their surrounding areas, 
enabling us to test whether wages are affected by the population spatial distribution as well 
as by its size. Intuitively, we define a large city as a self-contained labor market with a 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
24 In this vein, Adamson, Clark and Partridge (2004) estimate (log) hourly wages as a function of population 
size and its square and interpret the former as the favorable urban amenities effect and the latter as a crowding 
effect. 
25 Table 1 lists the 40 LLMs that fall in the top 5 percent of the population distribution. A comparison 
between columns (1.2) and (1.3), reporting, respectively, the cumulative population and area size percentages, 
provides indication of the high degree of urbanization in Italy. Indeed, while in the US 80 percent of the whole 
population resides in large cities (i.e., SMAs) and less than 2 percent of the territory is paved (Duranton and 
Puga, 2004), in Italy the same percentage of land is occupied by just the first 4 most populated LLMs, 
collecting only 18 percent of the total population. 
26 Spatial autocorrelation is positive when high or low values of a random variable (e.g., the population 
level) tend to cluster in space (spatial clusters); it is negative when geographical areas tend to be surrounded by 
neighbors with dissimilar values (spatial outliers); it is close to zero  if the observed values are arranged 
randomly and independently over space (spatial randomness). Note that spatial data analysis techniques first 
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population that is both above the national mean
27 and is also significantly correlated with the 
population of its surrounding k-LLMs.
28 More precisely, we define large cities as the LLMs 
in either the HH or in the HL quadrants of the Moran Scatterplot that display a significant 
local Moran’s I statistic (see Appendix I).
29 In Table 2 we report the outcome, obtained using 
k-nearest neighbors weighting matrices (this choice is motivated and described in Appendix 
II) with k=5 and k=10 (in Table 2a and Table 2b, respectively).
30 The table shows all the 
LLMs displaying (up to) 10 percent-level significant values of the local Moran’s I statistics 
(second column), with the corresponding position in the Moran Scatterplot (last column). 
Thus, among all the areas in either the HH or the HL regime (i.e., with a population above 
the national average) we consider as large cities only those that are associated to a significant 
statistic (in bold),
31 obtaining a population cut-off point of 404,526 inhabitants. Then, we 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
consider population as a random variable and then test the null hypothesis of its spatial randomness (i.e., that is 
uniformily distributed over the territory). 
27 This choice is consistent with the purpose of this exercise, that is, the identification of the LLMs more 
likely to be endowed with favorable urban amenities such as airports or specialized schools, which requires a 
large population mass. The kind of urban agglomeration effects likely to arise in the smaller Italian cities (e.g., 
in Tuscany or in the North-East of the country) are meant to be captured by our alternative measure of 
agglomeration, employment density. 
28 Clearly, the k-surrounding LLMs are not part of the large city itself, though they are necessary to define 
which LLM with a population above the national average can be considered as a large city. 
29 To assess the presence of spatial dependence in the distribution of a variable in any partition of the 
territory a number of alternative statistics can be used. To increase the robustness of our methodology we also 
employed the Getis-Ord statistic (Getis and Ord, 1995). While the local Moran’s I statistic considers the 
correlation between the value of a variable in a given area with that of its neighbors, the Getis-Ord statistic is 
based on the comparison between the average value within a given neighborhood set and the global average. 
Thus, while both these methods identify the spatial clusters (see footnote 25), only the local Moran’s I statistic 
allows to detect the spatial outliers (i.e., the areas in the high (low) regime surrounded by neighbors with 
significantly lower (higher) values). Since this is precisely the object of our analysis, we chose to report the 
results obtained with the local Moran’s I statistic. The threshold values obtained with the Getis-Ord statistic for 
the definition of a large city are virtually the same. 
30 Because the local Moran’s I statistic is based on the comparison between the population level of a given 
area with the average of its neighbors, using different neighborhood sets with large differences in population 
size might change the test results. Thus, we also tried k-nearest neighbor weight matrices for any k between 1 
and 10 (any choice in the range k>10 would not be reasonable in a context of a densely populated country like 
Italy, where centers of population are located relatively close to each other), with substantially the same results. 
Indeed, increasing the number of areas in the neighborhood set assigns the same LLMs, with a significant value 
of the local Moran’s I statistic, to the HH or HL quadrants of the Moran Scatterplot. Thus, our results are robust 
to both the statistics used (i.e., local Moran’s I and Getis-Ord) and the choice of the weighting matrix. 
31 Note that all these areas, corresponding to the first nineteen LLMs listed in Table 1, would be considered 
large cities in the Italian “common wisdom”, with the only exception of Desio. However, this LLM 
neighboring Milan ranks 17
th in terms of population mass and 5
th in terms of density. Moreover, none of the 
LLMs with a population above the national average excluded from the large-city set because of a non-
significant local Moran’s I (i.e., Valentano, Fiuggi, Tuscania and Canazei) would by no means be considered as 
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distinguish between the large cities surrounded by highly populated labor markets (in the HH 
regime) from those that are not (in the HL regime). This is a particularly interesting feature 
of our methodology, because it enables us to test whether the HH and the HL-large cities 
provide different wage premia (see Section 5.1). 
4. Descriptive statistics 
In this section we present some descriptive evidence on the largest Italian labor 
markets, using data on both the LLM universe (above the 95
th percentile of the entire 
population distribution; Table 1) and our sample (above the large city threshold; Tables 3 
and 4).  
Table 3a compares our sample’s wage mean values in large cities to those elsewhere in 
the country and shows that the former are 5 percent higher than the latter (at the 1 percent 
level statistical significance), suggesting the existence of an urban wage premium (though 
quite limited in magnitude). 
To investigate on the possible sources of this wage differential, in Table 1 we report 
the statistics on the skill composition, unemployment rates and small firm concentration of 
the 5 percent most populated Italian LLMs. In summary, we find that the biggest markets 
host a large share of college graduates, display higher unemployment rates than the rest of 
the economy and do not contain industrial clusters of small firms. 
In particular, with respect to skill composition, column (1.4) reports the cumulative 
percentage of the most highly educated people (with at least a bachelor's degree) and shows 
that roughly one-third of them lives in the first six LLMs (containing one-fifth of the total 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
a large city by the Italian “common wisdom”. Furthermore, observe that neither choice of the weighting matrix 
leads to the identification of any significant clustering of areas in the LL regime. In other words, there is no 
significant local statistic associated to the little populated Italian LLMs (i.e., below average) surrounded by 
areas with a similarly low level of population. These findings, together with a non-significant value of the 
global Moran’s I statistic (which confirms that, globally, the hypothesis of spatial randomness of the Italian 
population distribution cannot be rejected), provide further evidence of the spread of the Italian population over 
the national territory. The standardized (global) Moran’s I value is equal to 1.0833 (p-value = 0.2787) and to 
1.5290 (p-value=0.1262), using k-nearest neighbors weight matrices with k=5 and k=10 respectively. 
(Asymptotic) normality is assumed.     22
population).
32 Also a comparison between Figure 1
33 - representing the spatial distribution of 
the LLM residing population - and Figure 2 - mapping the share of college graduates in total 
residents – reveals that in Italy high human capital workers concentrate in the most highly 
populated LLMs, suggesting that urban wage premia could be due to workers’ education 
composition effects.  
With respect to the second point, the figures on unemployment rates in column (1.5) 
do not appear to be clearly decreasing or increasing along with LLM population level. A 
visual inspection of Figure 3, mapping the LLM unemployment rate, would seem to confirm 
the common view that in Italy regional unemployment differentials are more clearly 
associated to the North-South divide than to a partition based on LLM population size.
34 
However, Table 3b reveals that average unemployment rates are roughly 2 percentage points 
higher in the largest LLMs than in the rest of the country (the two groups of areas appear to 
be quite homogeneous in terms of unemployment rate dispersion and the difference in mean 
values is statistically significant at the 1 percent level).
35 This evidence, together with that 
presented in Table 3a, shows that on average there is a positive association between 
earnings, unemployment rates and population size, suggesting that in large cities wages 
might be higher than elsewhere in order to offset the greater risk of unemployment.
36 In 
contrast, the wage-curve literature (see Card, 1995) finds a negative correlation between 
(log) wages and local unemployment (note that next section’s econometric results indicate 
that this is indeed the case once we control for individuals’ observable characteristics and 
area fixed effects).  
                                                           
32 A similar result is found by Glaeser (1999) for the US. 
33 The maps in Figures 1, 2 and 3 aggregate LLMs in homogeneous groups by minimizing the sum of the 
variance within each class, enabling us to visualize groupings and patterns inherent to the spatial structure of 
the data. 
34 Note that the LLM distribution by residing population is quite independent from geographical location 
(see Table 1's last column). 
35 Large cities seem to be characterized by higher unemployment rates also in the Italian Labor Force 
Survey data (see Di Addario, 2005). 
36 According to the compensating wage differential hypothesis, in specialized cities wages are higher in 
order to compensate individuals from a greater unemployment risk (see Diamond and Simon, 1990).      23
Finally, the figures of Table 1 indicate that in Italy urbanization and localization 
effects are quite distinct phenomena when the latter is measured with the presence of 
Industrial Districts, which are the most common form of Italian industrial agglomeration.
37 
Indeed, column (1.6) shows that no Industrial District is within the ten most populated 
LLMs, and only four can be classified as a large city (namely, Padua, Desio, Bergamo and 
Como).  
Table 4 presents the entire set of descriptive statistics from our sample, which 
comprises all the wage-earners from a primary activity, for a total of 22,996 individuals 
distributed over 242 LLMs (30 percent of the total). Our sample includes all the 19 Italian 
large cities (see previous section), comprising a total of 6,796 employees.  
As expected, large cities contain more office workers, worker supervisors, and real 
estate employees than the rest of the economy. Furthermore, large-city workers are slightly 
older and experienced than those living elsewhere, again supporting the hypothesis that 
urban wage premia might be explained by the presence of higher human capital. Indeed, in 
line with Table 1’s evidence (based on the entire country), also our sample indicates that the 
employees who reside in the largest markets tend to be more educated than elsewhere: the 
difference in the mean values between the share of college graduates in the largest LLMs 
and that in the rest of the country is 27 percent and is statistically significant at the 1 percent 
level (Table 3c). In the next section we will obtain some indication on whether the most 
educated people prefer living in large cities because of the consumption amenities these offer 
or because of higher returns. 
                                                           
37 Industrial Districts are spatially concentrated clusters of small and medium sized firms specialized in one 
or few stages of a main manufacturing production (for a more detailed description see de Blasio and Di 
Addario, 2005). Of course, we are not ruling out the possibility that urbanization is correlated with the 
localization of large firms.     24
5. The estimation results 
In Section 5.1 we examine whether the prior of higher average wages in urban areas 
holds true after controlling for individual and LLM characteristics by estimating a log-linear 
Mincerian function augmented with the agglomeration variables: 




3 2 1 0 log , 
The dependent variable of our earnings function is the logarithm of employees’ hourly 
wage rates from primary activities, deflated with the consumer price index for blue-collar 
worker and employee households,
38 which is the inflation indicator used in national 
contracts. In addition to the standard Mincerian variables (experience, tenure, and education) 
we also control for the vector Z, including individual characteristics (e.g., sex and marital 
status), job qualification, some features of the worker's firm (e.g., firm size, industry 
dummies, type of contract, like, for instance, Adamson, Clark and Partridge, 2004), the 
unemployment rate of LLM of residence (as in the “wage-curve” literature)
39 and year 
dummies; u is the error term. 
We capture the urban effect with mainly three alternative variables: LLM employment 
density, LLM population mass and a dummy variable equal to one if the worker resides in a 
LLM with more than 404,526 inhabitants (see Section 3). Moreover, since the large city 
dummy and the LLM employment density are not highly correlated (the correlation 
coefficient is 0.6), we are also able to test their joint effect. This is a particularly interesting 
feature of our dataset, as it enables us to separate the contribution supplied by areas’ 
population size, which proxies desirable urban amenity effects (since the provision of goods 
such as airports, specialized schools, operas, ethnic restaurants, etc. might require a certain 
critical population mass), from that provided by areas’ employment density, which is a better 
                                                           
38 Wages are net of taxes, social security contributions, and fringe benefits, but include overtime work, any 
additional monthly salary (e.g., “13th month” salary), bonuses and special emoluments. The CPI, based in the 
year 1995, is net of tobacco and gross of indirect tax variations. 
39 Note that if labor was perfectly mobile across LLMs and sectors, local unemployment rates, industry and 
firm characteristics should not influence wages. However, in Italy labor mobility is rather low, and as a matter 
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proxy for agglomeration-enhanced productivity effects. Since consumption amenities tend to 
depress wages, we expect the effect of city size to be negative or at least lower than that of 
employment density. 
Moreover, we test the existence of threshold effects beyond the 75
th and the 90
th-99
th 
percentiles of both the employment density and the population size sample distributions, and 
also those beyond the 250000, 300000 and 350000 inhabitant-thresholds. In Section 5.1.1 we 
tackle the endogeneity issues by undertaking a number of robustness check (e.g., controlling 
for regional fixed effects and ability, instrumenting education, etc). 
In Section 5.2 we study whether larger markets exhibit a different wage structure. We 
thus estimate a version of the previous earnings functions where we add the interactions 
between all the regressors and the agglomeration variables, to calculate, in particular, the 
urbanization differentials in the returns to education, experience and tenure. 
5.1   Urban wage premia 
Table 5 reports the outcome of the ordinary least square estimates. We test four 
specifications for each of the agglomeration variables considered: the LLM population mass 
(columns (5.1)-(5.4)), the LLM employment density (columns (5.5)-(5.8)), and the large city 
dummy (columns (5.9)-(5.12)); in columns (5.13)-(5.16) we estimate the joint effect of these 
last two variables. Thus, the vector of control variables in columns (5.1), (5.5), (5.9) and 
(5.13) includes the standard individuals' observable characteristics (i.e., education, second-
order effects of experience and tenure, sex, marital status, the macro-region of residence
40) 
and the LLM unemployment rate.
41 Then, we gradually introduce firm characteristics and 
job qualification, and in columns (5.2), (5.6), (5.10) and (5.14) we also control for the sector 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
of fact these variables are commonly found to be important determinant of wages in the international empirical 
literature.  
40 That is, dummies for North and South, intended to capture the amenities associated to the region rather 
than to the city. 
41 After testing higher order polynomials of local unemployment rate, Blanchflower and Oswald 
(Blanchflower, David G. and Andrew J. Oswald. 1994. The Wage Curve. Cambridge, Massachussets and 
London: MIT Press; cited in Card, 1995) conclude that a linear term approximates well the unemployment-
wage relation.     26
and the size of the worker's firm
42 and for the type of work contract (full-time versus part-
time), while in the third, seventh, eleventh and fifteenth specifications we add the worker’s 
job status.
43 Finally, we relax the constraint of linearity between the logarithm of wages and 
education splitting the years of education into three dummies: middle school attainment, 
secondary school education and university degree or above (columns (5.4), (5.8), (5.12) and 
(5.16)). 
Since our territorial unit of analysis is the LLM, all our regressions are standard error-
adjusted for within-labor market correlation.
44 As evident from Table 5, all the Mincerian 
variables are always highly significant (at the 1 percent level) and their effect is invariant to 
changes in the agglomeration proxy used. Thus, unless explicitly stated, from now on we 
will refer to specifications (5.3), (5.7), (5.11) and (5.15), which we take as our benchmark. 
In line with the predictions of the human capital literature, the earnings function is 
concave both in experience and firm tenure. More specifically, while a marginal increase in 
general human capital (at the mean) raises wages by about 5 percent, a marginal increase in 
firm-specific capital raises earnings by 4 percent. Similarly to other results on Italy, an extra 
year of education increases wages by 2 percent.
45 However, when we split years of schooling 
into the three education dummies, we find that only the workers with a high-school diploma 
and college graduates or post-graduates earn a significantly higher wage than those with 
primary education or no qualification (the differentials are, respectively, 10 and 27 percent 
large; columns (5.4), (5.8), (5.12) and (5.16)), while the individuals with a middle school 
                                                           
42 More specifically, we adopt the finest breakdown available in the SHIW: manufacturing; building and 
construction; wholesale and retail trade, repair of motor vehicles; transport, warehouse, storage and 
communication services; credit and insurance services; real estate and renting services, IT services, research, 
other professional and business activities; and public sector (general government, defence, education, health 
and other public services). The benchmark is thus the agricultural sector (plus domestic services provided to 
households). To control for firm size we use a dummy equal to one if the worker’s company has less than 100 
employees.  
43 The breakdown available for job status is the following: office worker; school teacher; worker supervisor 
or junior manager; manager, senior official, principal, headmaster, university professor, magistrate. Our 
benchmark is blue-collar workers (including apprentices and home-workers).  
44 Since our 22,996 observations are distributed over 230 LLMs in four time periods we have enough 
degrees of freedom for our estimations (see Card, 2001).  
45 Psacharopoulos (1994), for instance, examines returns to education for a large number of countries and 
obtains a 2.3 percent estimate for Italy.     27
attainment do not.
46 The job qualification dummies are always significant: office workers 
earn 11-14 percent more than blue-collar workers, while worker supervisors and managers, 
respectively, 25 and 47 percent more. All sectors display higher wages than the agricultural 
one, but the largest premium (21-23 percent) accrues to the credit and insurance service 
sectors. Controlling for individuals' work status, eliminates any public-private sector wage 
differential, in line with Dell'Aringa, Lucifora and Origo (1995).
47 As expected, we find 
significantly negative female-male and small-large firm wage gaps (about 10 percent large 
the former and 13 percent the latter). Consistently with the findings of the wage-curve 
literature, the individuals residing in LLMs with higher unemployment rates earn 
significantly less (–0.4 percent).
48 Interestingly, while working in the North gives a 2-3 
percent premium with respect to the Center, controlling for the level of urbanization 
eliminates the negative South differential almost completely.  
In relation to the objective of this study, we always find evidence of the existence of an 
average urban wage premium, though very small in size. Thus, an increase of 100 LLM 
employees per square kilometer  raises earnings by 0.4-0.6 percent, and every additional 
100,000 inhabitants in the LLM provides workers with 0.1 percent higher wages (in line 
with Diamond’s and Simon’s (1990) results for the US).
49 The magnitude of these two 
effects is of a comparable size, as the responsiveness of wages to changes in employment 
density or population size in terms of standard deviation is virtually the same. Indeed, one 
standard deviation increase in employment density raises (log) wages by 4.9 percent of their 
standard deviation, whereas one standard deviation rise in the level of population increases 
(log) earnings by 5.1 percent of their standard deviation. Furthermore, working in a LLM 
                                                           
46 This is not surprising in the light of the fact that middle school has been the level of compulsory 
education for about 35 years (from the 1962 Mandatory Middle School Reform to 1999).  
47 The authors find that the public-private sector wage gap is largely explained by local labor market 
conditions, which, anyhow, affect above all the private sector.  
48 The elasticity of wages with respect to local unemployment rate is about -0.04, half the size of that found 
by Blanchflower and Oswald using annual earnings for the U.K. (Card, 1995). Note that Glaeser and Maré 
(2001) do not control for area’s unemployment rates. If we omit this variable from our regressions the urban 
wage premium remains statistically significant but lowers in all specifications. This is because in the Italian 
largest cities unemployment rates are higher than in the rest of the economy (see previous section). Thus, 
including unemployment rates is important especially in countries like Italy, where labor mobility is slow.     28
with more than 400,000 inhabitants provides employees with a 2-3 percent higher wage 
(columns (5.9)-(5.12)).  
The existence of an urban wage premium, even if small in magnitude, necessarily 
implies that in Italy the combined positive effect of agglomeration-induced productivity 
gains, poaching diseconomies and people’s distaste for urban disamenities (e.g., higher 
house rents and prices)
50 prevails over the negative impact of workers’ preferences for large-
city amenities. In order to disentangle the effect of these factors we run another set of 
regressions controlling for both LLM employment density and the large city dummy 
(columns (5.13)-(5.16)), under the hypothesis that the former proxies labor productivity, 
while the latter urban amenities (i.e., the provision of airports, specialized schools, operas, 
ethnic restaurants, etc.). We find that employment density provides a 0.3-0.5 percent 
premium while the large city dummy loses significance, implying that once agglomeration-
induced productivity gains are controlled for, the preferences for consumption amenities are 
not strong enough to affect wages. This finding is also confirmed when we substitute 
employment density with LLM population density,
51 even though the latter provides a lower 
premium (0.1-0.2 percent).  
For completeness, we also test the impact of dummy variables defined both on 
arbitrary cut-off points (i.e., LLM with at least 200,000, 250,000, and 300,000 inhabitants) 
and on the basis of the 75
th, 90
th-99
th percentiles of the LLM employment density and 






52 (the others are available upon request) of our benchmark specification, 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
49 Measuring these effects in logarithms provides an elasticity of wages both with respect to employment 
density and with respect to population mass of 0.01. Thus, worker i‘s wage is 0.7 percent higher than worker j’s 
if the employment density or population size of his residing LLM is double the size of j’s. 
50 Similarly to Adamson, Clark and Partridge (2004), we do not control for LLM house prices and rents 
precisely because we are interested in the net effect of all these factors on wages. 
51 This variable, while being a worse proxy of labor productivity than LLM employment density, captures 
the negative externalities exercised by the population as a whole (e.g., higher housing prices, more intense 
traffic jams, pollution, etc.) rather than by the employees on each other. Results are available upon request.  
52 The 99
th percentile of the population distribution (2,460,534 inhabitants) includes the three largest LLMs 
(Rome, Milan and Naples); the 95
th percentile (604,009 inhabitants) adds Venice, Catania, Bologna, Genova, 
Palermo, Florence, Bari and Turin; while the 90
th percentile (Caserta) and the 75
th (Gallarate) contain, 
respectively, 382,734 and 190,659 inhabitants. The 200,000-inhabitant threshold corresponds to the LLM of 
Treviglio, the 250,000-inhabitant threshold to Trieste, and the 300,000-inhabitant threshold to Udine (the 
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showing the presence of a significant wage premium for any threshold value we tested. 
While agglomeration externalities do not exhibit any specific pattern with respect to LLM 
population size (columns (6.1)-(6.4)), they monotonically increase with employment density 
(columns (6.6)-(6.9)), with a premium raising from 1.6 percent in the 75
th percentile of the 
distribution to 4.6 percent in the three densest LLMs (Milan, Desio and Naples). However, 
when we add LLM population size or employment density all the threshold dummies used 
lose significance (results available if requested), implying that the urbanization-wage curve 
is indeed log-linear. This finding is also confirmed by the fact that when we lift the 
imposition of linearity between (log) earnings and the urbanization variables, and we test 
higher order polynomials (with quadratic and cubic terms) of both population and 
employment density, these are never significant (results are not reported due to space 
constraints).  
Finally, we test the hypothesis that the scope of agglomeration economies depends on 
population spatial structure by distinguishing between the large cities surrounded by highly 
populated labor markets (HH) from those that are not (HL; see Section 3). Column (6.5), 
reporting the results corresponding to the benchmark specification ((5.11)), shows that only 
the estimated coefficient for large cities of the HL type is statistically significant, with an 
estimated 2 percent wage premium. This finding supports the hypothesis that agglomeration 
economies or consumption amenity effects manifest themselves only when there is a 
sufficiently large difference between large cities and their surroundings, confirming that the 
spatial distribution of LLM population is an important determinant of urbanization 
externalities.
53 
                                                                                                                                                                                   





percentiles of the employment density distribution correspond, respectively, to: 0.87, 0.43, 0.30 and 0.16 
employees per LLM square kilometer. 
53 In order to test for the presence of residual spatial autocorrelation, which could potentially bias our 
estimation results, we also estimated LLMs’ fixed effects and performed a Moran’s I test on the obtained 
series. The results (available upon request) provide no evidence on the presence of unobserved spatial effects in 
all the model specifications.      30
5.1.1 Robustness checks 
Urban wage premia may be affected by individuals’ unobservable characteristics 
correlated with both the agglomeration variables and wages. For instance, large cities may 
exhibit higher average wages because they attract the most able workers (e.g., because, by 
being more productive and thus earning more, they might be better capable of affording the 
higher rents due to congestion). If this were the case, the OLS estimates of urban 
agglomeration would be biased upwards. However, it is also possible that large cities attract 
the least able workers, because of their stronger informal labor market (e.g., illegal activities) 
drawing in ‘bad type’ job seekers, or because of the availability of a larger offer of vacancies 
(e.g., from a more generous government support), creating an additional demand for the less 
productive matches. If city size was in fact negatively correlated with ability, our OLS 
agglomeration effect estimates would be biased downwards. Thus, the sign of the bias 
(provided it existed) is ultimately a matter of empirical estimation. 
A possible method to separate agglomeration effects from the impact of self-selection 
into large cities is the estimation of a balanced panel where the area-fixed effects are 
identified by the individuals who change LLM of residence over time (the “movers”) and 
those who do not (the “stayers”; see, for instance, Combes, Duranton and Gobillon, 2003). 
An alternative method consists in testing whether the movers into a larger city receive a 
wage premium and whether the movers into a smaller town bear a wage loss (see Glaeser 
and Maré, 2001). However, none of these methods can be carried out in this paper, as our 
sample does not contain movers (i.e., none of the individuals interviewed by the SHIW 
changed LLM of residence in the period 1995-2002). This is not too surprising, as our 
territorial units of analysis are the self-contained LLMs (see Section 3). Moreover, 
endogeneity issues are typically not a major concern in a country like Italy, where labor 
mobility is particularly low in levels and has been decreasing over time (Cannari, Nucci, and 
Sestito, 2000) and where people’s residential choices are conditioned to a large extent by the 
location of their family, while being affected by the heavy imperfections of the housing 
market (see Di Addario (2005) for a more complete discussion on these issues).  
Nevertheless, we are able to undertake a couple of sensitivity checks.     31
First, on the sub-sample of the employees with at least a secondary school attainment 
who have been interviewed in 2000 or 2002, we can include two proxies for ability among 
the regressors: the final mark and a dummy for laude.
54 Since the smaller sample size (5,314 
observations) and the characteristics of the individuals sampled may create a self-selection 
problem, we run the regressions both without and with ability (respectively, columns (7.5)-
(7.8) and (7.9)-(7.12)). We find that indeed there is a selection problem, as in this sub-
sample all urbanization effects disappear. This result suggests that the most highly educated 
employees do not benefit from agglomeration externalities, in line with next section’s 
findings, where we analyze more thoroughly whether the gains from urbanization vary with 
educational attainment. When we add the two ability proxies we find that the only factor 
having a positive impact on wages is having graduated with a laude, while the mark obtained 
does not make any difference. Nevertheless, including ability does not change the results on 
agglomeration, supporting the view that omitting ability should not cause serious 
endogeneity problems in our urbanization variables.  
Second, we test whether our results could in fact be driven by area-specificities 
different from urbanization by controlling for regional fixed effects.
55 Table 8 shows the 
main results for our benchmark specification.
56 The urban wage premium arising from 
employment density is now slightly lower (0.3 against 0.4 percent), while that accruing to 
large cities is a little higher (2.3 against 2 percent). However, when we control for both the 
large city dummy and the LLM employment density (column (8.4)), we find that the former 
provides a 3 percent premium while the latter becomes non-significant, reverting Table 5’s 
result. To test whether this finding could in fact be driven by the North-South divide, we run 
two separate regressions on the Center-North and the on South sub-samples. Indeed, 
columns (8.5)-(8.8) and columns (8.9)-(8.12) seem to reflect the presence of different 
                                                           
54 Unfortunately, this is the only sample on which we have information on the final mark obtained (for 
college graduates we also know whether they received a laude). 
55 Since LLMs are more disaggregated than Regions, we are able to control for 19 regional fixed effects 
(Piedmont is the omitted Region). In the previous regressions we were just controlling for the macro-area of 
residence (North and South).  
56 In this paper we report only the results on the relevant variables; for a complete version of Tables 7-9, see 
Di Addario and Patacchini (2005).     32
agglomeration-externality mechanisms:
57 population size generates higher premia in the 
South than elsewhere, while employment density has a positive impact on wages only in the 
Center-North. The former result may be due to the fact that Southerners have weaker 
preferences for living in large cities than Northerners, possibly because the Southern large 
cities are less endowed with the desirable amenities depressing wages than the Northern 
ones. The latter result is not too surprising in the light of the fact that labor productivity is 
typically lower in the South of the country and that employment density proxies 
productivity-enhancing agglomeration effects. It is thus possible that the current productivity 
level in South is far too low for agglomeration economies to generate any amplifying effect; 
alternatively, there might be unobservable characteristics (e.g., the mafia, high levels of 
criminality, etc.) preventing Marshallian externalities from taking place.  
Summarizing, we can conclude that after controlling for endogeneity issues workers of 
given individual characteristics tend to earn more, on average, in the largest local labor 
markets. We have shown that this result is not just due to skill composition effects (e.g., the 
greater presence of college graduates in large cities emerged in the descriptive statistics), 
since we still find evidence of an urban wage premium after controlling for both education 
and work status. Finally, we can also disregard the hypothesis that large-city wage 
differentials are a compensation for a greater unemployment risk, since once we control for 
individuals’ observable characteristics the effect of local unemployment rates on earnings 
becomes negative. 
5.2  The urban wage structure 
In this section we analyze whether urbanization affects the structure of wages. Indeed, 
agglomeration effects may not be skill-neutral, unevenly affecting the wages of workers with 
different characteristics. In particular, we are interested in examining whether returns to 
                                                           
57 A different wage sensitivity to urbanization in the two macro-areas could be due to several factors: the 
large productivity differentials, generating a disparity in the scope of agglomeration externalities; cultural 
differences, affecting individuals’ evaluation of urban amenities and disamenities; a structural diversity in 
cities’ characteristics (i.e., the ones in the South being less efficient, less endowed with cultural events and 
infrastructures, more subject to high criminal rates, etc. than those in the North).     33
education, experience, and tenure vary with LLM population level, LLM employment 
density or between the largest cities and the rest of the country. 
The descriptive statistics presented in Section 4 indicate that large cities attract (or 
produce) the most experienced and educated workers. This phenomenon could possibly be 
due to returns to experience and education increasing with urban scale, but also to the most 
skilled people having a relatively stronger preference for large-city amenities than low 
skilled workers. In the former case we should observe higher urban return-to-education 
and/or to experience differentials, in the latter case, the reverse.  
The findings of Table 7 (columns (7.1)-(7.8)) seem to suggest that returns to education 
do not increase with urbanization. In specifications (7.9)-(7.12), we test the exogeneity of 
our education variable with a two-step instrumental variable methodology,
58 instrumenting 
the individuals’ years of schooling with their father’s and mother’s age, years of education 
and work status. Even though these instruments are probably not ideal, as their validity relies 
on the assumption that parents’ family background is unrelated to offsprings’ wages (which 
cannot be tested), they are certainly highly correlated to the individual’s educational 
attainment (the F-test always rejects the null hypothesis that all the instruments’ coefficients 
in the first step equation are zero at the 1 pecent significance level). Moreover, when we 
incorporate the residuals of the first step regression obtained with these instruments into our 
Mincerian wage functions we can never reject the hypothesis that their estimated coefficient 
is equal to zero in any of the specifications tested, implying that education is not 
endogenous. Nevertheless, we also report the outcome of the regressions where years of 
education was instrumented with family background (Table 7). Columns (7.9)–(7.12) show 
the instrumental variable estimate results corresponding to our benchmark specifications. 
The number of observations drops to 19,310 because not all individuals gave information on 
                                                           
58 In the first step, years of schooling is estimated as a function of both the (exogenous) regressors of the 
original wage equation and the instruments. In the second step, the residuals from this regression are added to 
the set of explanatory variables in the Mincerian wage function. If the null hypothesis that the coefficient of 
these residuals is equal to zero cannot be rejected, education can be considered exogenous (see Wooldridge, 
2002, p. 90-92).     34
their parents’ background,
59 but the agglomeration estimates maintain a similar sign, 
magnitude and significance level to those in Table 5, confirming that the possible 
endogenous sorting of workers into cities is not a major concern in our analysis.  
Table 9 shows the key results corresponding to a version of Table 5 augmented with 
the interactions between all the regressors and, alternatively, LLM population size (columns 
(9.1)-(9.4)), LLM employment density (columns (9.5)-(9.8)), the large city dummy (columns 
(9.9)-(9.12)), and the interaction between these last two variables (columns (9.13)-(9.16)). 
Thus, for instance, the coefficient of the interaction between the large-city dummy and the 
college graduate dummy (column (9.12)) represents the large-city return to bachelor's degree 
differential with respect to the rest of the economy, while, more generally, the coefficient of 
the interaction with population size tells whether returns to university degree vary with urban 
scale (column (9.4)). Since the robustness checks presented in Tables 7 and 8 do not show 
signs of endogeneity in either our agglomeration or education variables, we will report only 
the results of the OLS estimations.
60  
We find that urban agglomeration does not generate monetary incentives to invest in 
human capital accumulation, neither in general nor on-the-job. Indeed, the urbanization 
differentials in the returns to experience are virtually zero,
61 while those in the return to 
tenure in current firm are negative (columns (9.1)-(9.8)). In particular, a marginal increase in 
LLM employment density (or a 100,000-inhabitant increase in LLM population size) reduces 
returns to seniority by 0.1 percent. This finding is consistent with the view according to 
which tenure is negatively correlated to the efficiency of the worker-firm match (as high 
                                                           
59 To increase the number of observations we also did the same exercise using only father’s background as 
instruments. The number of observations raises to 20,692 but results are qualitatively the same.  
60 Moreover, IV estimates are not without problems. Not only they are sensitive to the choice of the 
instruments, but even when “based on ideal instruments (observable factors that are by assumption independent 
of individual abilities) [they] will typically recover a weighted average of returns to education for people whose 
education choices were affected by the instrument, rather than the average marginal return to education in the 
population” (Card (2001), p. 1157). Finally, there is no agreement on the sign of OLS estimates’ bias. While a 
number of studies finds a positive bias (see Card (2001) for a review), on the basis of 1985-1995 data on 28 
worldwide countries, Trostel, Walker and Woolley (2002) find that the OLS return-to-education coefficients 
are downward biased with respect to IV estimates.  
61 A marginal increase in experience (at the mean) determines a mere 0.01 percent higher growth in worker 
j’s earnings than in worker k’s, if j resides in a LLM with 1 million more inhabitants than k’s. The differential 
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quality workers tend to change job more frequently, Stevens, 2003) and positively related to 
agglomeration.  
On average, we find a weak evidence of negative return-to-education differentials in 
the largest labor markets. Indeed, the interaction between years of schooling and our 
agglomeration variables provides a significant estimate only when we measure urbanization 
with LLM population size (column (9.3)). However, when we release the imposition of a 
linear relationship between wages and education, we find that returns to bachelor's degree 
are systematically negatively correlated with all our agglomeration variables, while returns 
to lower attainment are not affected by location.
62 In particular, returns to bachelor's degree 
decrease with urban scale: a 100,000-inhabitant increase in LLM population size lowers 
college graduates' wages by 0.3 percent (column (9.4)), while living in a large city entails a 7 
percent reduction (column (9.12)). Furthermore, a college graduate employed in LLM j, with 
100 employees per square kilometer more than LLM k’s, earns 0.9 percent less than a similar 
worker in k, while j’s employees lose 0.1 percent of their earnings with respect to k’s for 
every extra year of tenure in their current firm (column (9.8)). This outcome is in line both 
with Adamson, Clark and Partridge (2004), who find that doubling the population in the US 
SMA population lowers returns to university degree by 2 percentage points (3 percent in the 
eight largest cities), and with Black, Kolesnikova and Taylor (2005), who show that the US 
high-amenity cities (i.e., San Francisco, New York and Seattle) exhibit lower returns to 
university degree than the low-amenity ones (e.g., Houston, Pittsburgh). These results 
suggest that both in Italy and in the US the skill-biased urban amenity effect dominates the 
skill-biased agglomeration one.
63 Indeed, since the most highly educated workers have a 
stronger preference for living in large cities than for living elsewhere (Table 3c) in spite of 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
increase in returns to experience is slightly higher – though less significant - when we measure urbanization 
with employment density. 
62 In this respect, urban and industrial agglomeration effects are rather similar in Italy. Indeed, de Blasio and 
Di Addario (2005) show that the zero average premium in Industrial Districts reflects higher returns to 
education for the workers with an elementary attainment or less with respect to similarly qualified workers 
outside, and lower returns for the more educated employees. 
63 Note that with the term “skill” we strictly refer to schooling attainment, as in contrast to returns to 
education, returns to job qualification increase with urban scale. Thus, urbanization “rewards” job qualification 
and penalizes education.     36
earning lower wages, there must be urban consumption amenities that compensate their 
income loss.
64 
In contrast to the previous results (but not with other results of the literature),
65 we find 
that returns to job qualification increase with urban scale. Thus, office workers’ and worker 
supervisors' earn, respectively, an extra 0.1 and 0.5 percent more for every additional 
100,000 inhabitants in their LLM (beyond the 400,000-inhabitant threshold these 
differentials raise to 3 and 13 percent, respectively, columns (9.9)-(9.12)). Moreover, as it is 
evident from specifications (9.15)-(9.16), a 100-employee-per-square-kilometer increase 
raises only the earnings of managers (by 1.8-2.1 percent), while living in a large city affects 
just worker supervisors’ wages (8-9 percent higher than elsewhere). These results suggest 
that in Italy urbanization remunerates more job qualification than educational attainment. 
Finally, we find that LLM population size and employment density raise earnings in 
the public sector and in the real estate and IT service sectors, while further depressing 
women’s wages.  
6. Concluding remarks 
This paper has analysed the impact of urban agglomeration on average wages and the 
structure of earnings in Italy. 
Using alternative measures of agglomeration, we find evidence of an urban wage 
premium, though very small in size. The large-city wage premium is just 2-3 percent wide, 
which, according to Glaeser’s and Maré’s (2001) findings is more than 20 percentage points 
lower than in the US. The large difference between the two countries could be explained 
either by the fact that Italians have stronger preferences for large-city amenities (or a weaker 
                                                           
64 We cannot directly test whether college graduates benefit more than less educated workers from urban 
productivity gains, but our results say that even if this was the case, the enhanced productivity effect is more 
than offset by the negative impact on wages deriving from skill-biased urban amenities. 
65 Also Rosenthal and Strange (2005) find differentials in the returns to job qualification: for every 
additional 10,000 college graduate workers within 5 miles, lawyers and scientists earn, respectively, a 12.8 and 
a 4.5 percent premium, while engineers’ and mechanics’ wages are not affected.     37
distaste for urban congestion)
 than Americans,
66 or by the fact that the productivity gains 
generated by agglomeration economies are larger in the US than in Italy. There are mainly 
two reasons for why this should be the case. First, because the longer history of wage 
flexibility in the US gave agglomeration externalities more time to develop.
67 Indeed, 
reforms aimed at increasing the response of wages to productivity and market conditions 
(e.g., unemployment levels) have been introduced only very recently in Italy.
68 Before 1990s 
wages were rigid and had little scope to vary locally, because the bargaining system was 
very centralized. Only in 1993 were reforms introduced to increase the degree of firm-level 
bargaining and to reduce the gap between the public and the private sector wage setting 
(Dell'Aringa, Lucifora and Origo, 1995). Second, productivity gains generated by 
agglomeration economies might be greater in the US because of a higher degree of 
inequality in the spatial distribution of the population. In this paper we argued that the 
magnitude of agglomeration externalities depends on the level of differentiation between the 
agglomeration characteristics (i.e., size or density of the city’s population or employment) of 
the area in question and those of its neighboring zones, which is usually taken not to matter 
by the literature. This hypothesis is supported by our results. Indeed, the absence of any 
threshold effect beyond the various cut-off points tested (neither in terms of size nor in terms 
of density), together with the finding that wage premia exist only in the large cities that are 
surrounded by particularly low-populated areas might imply that the earning differentials 
due to agglomeration are lower than in the US simply because in Italy large cities are less 
                                                           
66 Preferences might be different for cultural, historical or even architectural reasons (Italians consider 
living in the center of cities more prestigious, while Americans prefer the suburbs), or because of differences in 
the availability of non-monetary benefits (e.g., more job posting by firms). In Italy, for instance, urbanization 
increases job seekers’ chances of finding employment per unit of search (Di Addario, 2005) - but we do not 
know of any similar study based on US data to be able to make a comparison.  
67 See Rosenthal and Strange (2004) for a review on the temporal scope of agglomeration economies. 
However, while this literature usually refers to the dynamics of agglomeration economies (e.g., learning takes 
time to develop and then decays), here we are referring to a sort of structural break induced by the removal of 
institutional constraints (i.e., a fully centralized wage setting), lessening wage sensitivity to agglomeration 
externalities.  
68 Although this hypothesis does not seem to be supported by our data. Indeed, if the agglomeration effect 
depended on the timing of reforms we would expect its magnitude to increase over time. However, when we 
split the impact of urbanization into the four periods of our sample, the interactions between the year dummies 
and the urbanization variables do not show any specific upward time-trend (results available upon request). 
Since our sample may be too short to observe any trend, it would thus be interesting to study the development 
of agglomeration economies over a longer period of time. The Italian case would be an ideal setting to study 
this issue as wages have been rather rigid until 1990s.      38
differentiated from their environing areas. This suggests that more research is probably 
needed on the relationship between agglomeration economies and the population spatial 
distribution. 
Finally, we have shown that the nearly non-existence of large-city wage premia hides 
substantially different losses and gains for different categories of workers that cancel out in a 
sort of zero-sum game. Indeed, we find that urbanization increases the monetary returns of 
managers, worker supervisors and office workers, does not affect returns to overall 
experience in the labor market, and reduces the returns to education and to tenure with 
current firm. In particular, college graduates living in a large city are subject to a 7 percent 
wage reduction. This apparent paradox can be explained in a quality-of-life framework. 
Indeed, even if we cannot test whether the more educated employees benefit more than less 
educated workers from urban productivity gains, our results say that even if this was the 
case, the enhanced productivity effect is more than offset by the negative impact on wages 
deriving from education-biased urban amenities.  
    
Tables and figures 
 
Table 1 
CHARACTERISTICS OF ITALIAN URBAN AREAS 









District  Location 
  (1.1)  (1.2) (1.3) (1.4) (1.5) (1.6) (1.7)
1 Roma  0.06  0.01 0.12 0.09 No  Centre
2 Milano  0.11  0.02 0.20 0.06 No  North
3 Napoli  0.15  0.02 0.24 0.23 No  South
4 Torino  0.18  0.02 0.28 0.09 No  North
5 Bari  0.20  0.03 0.30 0.11 No  South
6 Firenze  0.21  0.04 0.32 0.09 No  Centre
7 Palermo  0.23  0.05 0.34 0.17 No  South
8 Genova  0.24  0.05 0.36 0.10 No  North
9 Bologna  0.25  0.05 0.38 0.05 No  North
10 Catania  0.26  0.06 0.40 0.16 No  South
11 Venezia  0.27  0.06 0.41 0.07 No  North
12 Padova  0.28  0.06 0.42 0.05 Yes  North
13 Desio  0.29  0.06 0.42 0.07 Yes  North
14 Taranto  0.30  0.07 0.43 0.19 No  South
15 Verona  0.31  0.07 0.44 0.06 No  North
16 Bergamo  0.32  0.07 0.45 0.04 Yes  North
17 Cagliari  0.32  0.08 0.46 0.19 No  Centre
18 Como  0.33  0.08 0.46 0.04 Yes  North
19 Lecce  0.34  0.09 0.47 0.20 No  North
20 Brescia  0.34  0.09 0.48 0.05 Yes  North
21 Caserta  0.35  0.09 0.48 0.16 No  South
22 Brindisi  0.36  0.10 0.49 0.12 No  South
23 Busto  Arsizio  0.36  0.10 0.49 0.09 Yes  North
24 Udine  0.37  0.10 0.50 0.06 Yes  North
25 Lecco  0.38  0.11 0.50 0.03 Yes North
26 Salerno  0.38  0.11 0.51 0.16 No  South
27 Frosinone  0.38  0.11 0.51 0.09 No  Centre
28 Reggio  Emilia  0.39  0.11 0.52 0.04 Yes North
29 Messina  0.39  0.12 0.53 0.18 No  South
30 Siracusa  0.40  0.12 0.53 0.16 No  South
31 Parma  0.40  0.12 0.54 0.05 Yes  North
32 Varese  0.41  0.12 0.54 0.06 Yes  North
33 Treviso  0.41  0.12 0.55 0.03 Yes  North
34 Pescara  0.42  0.13 0.55 0.11 No  Centre
35 Trieste  0.42  0.13 0.56 0.08 No  North
36 Prato  0.43  0.13 0.56 0.08 Yes  Centre
37 Modena  0.43  0.13 0.57 0.05 Yes  North
38 Aversa  0.43  0.13 0.57 0.29 No  South
39 Vicenza  0.44  0.13 0.57 0.04 Yes  North
40 Cosenza  0.44  0.14 0.58 0.20 No  South
Source: Labour Force Survey.  
Notes: Data are reported to the universe. The LLMs are ordered according to decreasing population size.    
Table 2 
MEASURES OF LOCAL SPATIAL CORRELATION  
2a : k = 5 
LLM LISA p-value Spatial regime
Milano  15.8706 0.0000 HH 
Bergamo  13.2544 0.0000 HH 
Como   12.0724 0.0000 HH 
Bari  5.5128 0.0000 HH 
Venezia  4.0667 0.0000 HH 
Napoli  -8.3513 0.0000 HL 
Roma  -6.9295 0.0000 HL 
Genova  -5.1671 0.0000 HL 
Torino  -3.8038 0.0001 HL 
Firenze  -2.6175 0.0089 HL 
Valentano  -2.3233 0.0202 LH 
Fiuggi  -2.1059 0.0352 LH 
Palermo  -2.0452 0.0408 HL 
Desio  2.333 0.0420 HH 
Tuscania  -2.0011 0.0454 LH 
Verona  2.0001 0.0454 HH 
Cagliari  -1.7089 0.0874 HL 
Catania  -1.6701 0.0949 HL 
Taranto  -1.6701 0.0949 HL 
Padova  -1.6701 0.0949 HL 
Bologna  -1.6561 0.0976 HL 
Lecce  -1.6488 0.0992 HL 
2b: k = 10 
Area LISA p-value Spatial regime
Milano  26.9516 0.0000 HH 
Bergamo  11.5786 0.0000 HH 
Como   9.8708 0.0000 HH 
Bari  5.6971 0.0000 HH 
Venezia  4.6005 0.0000 HH 
Napoli  -6.8583 0.0000 HL 
Torino  -5.8636 0.0000 HL 
Roma  -3.5889 0.0003 HL 
Palermo  -2.6998 0.0069 HL 
Genova  -2.6670 0.0077 HL 
Firenze  -2.6557 0.0079 HL 
Padova  -2.2000 0.0278 HL 
Bologna  -1.9195 0.0549 HL 
Cagliari  -1.9092 0.0562 HL 
Lecce  -1.8989 0.0576 HL 
Canazei  -1.8831 0.0597 LH 
Catania  -1.8719 0.0612 HL 
Taranto  -1.8377 0.0660 HL 
Verona  1.8289 0.0674 HH 
Desio  1.8221 0.0684 HH 
Valentano  -1.7929 0.0730 LH 
Source: Labour Force Survey. 
Notes: The LLMs are ordered according to decreasing significance levels.  
“Large cities” are in bold. LISA (Local Indicators of Spatial Association)  
stands for local Moran’s I statistic.    
Table 3 
WAGES, COLLEGE GRADUATES AND UNEMPLOYMENT 
 
3a: Wages (euro per hour) 
  Obs. Mean St.  dev.  Min  max 
Large cities  6,796 6.909 5.657 0.272 318.96 
Rest of the country  16,200 6.578 4.103 0.217 117.095 
T- test for equality in 





3b: Unemployment rate (percentages) 
  Obs. Mean St.  dev.  Min  Max 
Large cities  6,796 12.83 7.446 3.046 27.580 
Rest of the country  16,200 10.84 7.646 1.517 42.975 
T-test for equality in 





3c: College graduates (shares in total residing population) 
  Obs. Mean St.  dev.  Min  Max 
Large cities  6,796 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Rest of the country  16,200 0.11 0.31 0 1 
T-test for equality in 




Source: Survey of Household Income and Wealth. 






  Total sample  Large cities  Rest of the country 
  No.  Mean S.D.  No. Mean S.D.  No. Mean S.D. 
Hourly Wage deflated by year (1995)   22,996 6.68 4.62 6,796 6.91 5.66 16,200 6.58 4.10
Age   22,996 39.50 10.83 6,796 39.77 10.85 16,200 39.38 10.83
Labour Experience   22,996 19.52 11.61 6,796 19.61 11.71 16,200 19.48 11.57
Tenure   22,996 14.57 10.91 6,796 14.69 10.98 16,200 14.51 10.89
Years of education   22,996 11.02 3.89 6,796 11.20 4.03 16,200 10.94 3.83
Middle school   22,996 0.31 0.46 6,796 0.30 0.46 16,200 0.32 0.47
High school   22,996 0.45 0.50 6,796 0.45 0.50 16,200 0.46 0.50
Bachelor’s degree or higher   22,996 0.12 0.32 6,796 0.14 0.35 16,200 0.11 0.31
Dummy if female   22,996 0.41 0.49 6,796 0.40 0.49 16,200 0.41 0.49
Dummy if married   22,996 0.65 0.48 6,796 0.64 0.48 16,200 0.65 0.48
Dummy if North resident  22,996 0.48 0.50 6,796 0.53 0.50 16,200 0.46 0.50
Dummy if South resident    22,996 0.30 0.46 6,796 0.30 0.46 16,200 0.30 0.46
Dummy if working in a SME   22,996 0.49 0.50 6,796 0.48 0.50 16,200 0.49 0.50
Dummy if part-time worker  22,996 0.08 0.26 6,796 0.07 0.26 16,200 0.08 0.26
Dummy if working in industry   22,996 0.30 0.46 6,796 0.29 0.45 16,200 0.30 0.46
Dummy if work in construction  22,996 0.05 0.22 6,796 0.05 0.21 16,200 0.05 0.23
Dummy if work in trade  22,996 0.11 0.31 6,796 0.11 0.32 16,200 0.11 0.31
Dummy if work in transport  22,996 0.04 0.20 6,796 0.05 0.22 16,200 0.04 0.19
Dummy if work in banks  22,996 0.04 0.19 6,796 0.04 0.20 16,200 0.04 0.19
Dummy if work in real estate  22,996 0.04 0.19 6,796 0.05 0.21 16,200 0.03 0.18
Dummy if working in the public sector   22,996 0.35 0.48 6,796 0.33 0.47 16,200 0.35 0.48
Dummy if teacher  22,996 0.10 0.29 6,796 0.08 0.28 16,200 0.10 0.30
Dummy if office worker  22,996 0.36 0.48 6,796 0.40 0.49 16,200 0.34 0.47
Dummy if worker supervisor  22,996 0.07 0.25 6,796 0.09 0.29 16,200 0.06 0.23
Dummy if manager  22,996 0.03 0.16 6,796 0.03 0.17 16,200 0.03 0.16
LLM unemployment rate    22,996 11.43 7.64 6,796 12.83 7.45 16,200 10.85 7.65
LLM population level (in thousands)   22,996 574.69 888.86 6,796 1,647.97  1,010.65 16,200 124.44 84.01
LLM employment density (per square kilometre)  22,996 231.70 283.07 6,796 505.97 305.20 16,200 116.64 121.76
Source: Survey of Household Income and Wealth; Labour Force Survey. 






URBAN WAGE PREMIUM (OLS estimates) 
LLM population level  LLM employment density  Dependent variable:  
logarithm of wage  (5.1) (5.2) (5.3) (5.4) (5.5) (5.6) (5.7) (5.8) 
  Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
LLM population   0.0142  0.0010 0.0136 0.0000 0.0102 0.0000 0.0085 0.0010   
LLM employment density      0.0573 0.0000 0.0533 0.0000 0.0378 0.0000 0.0318 0.0020 
Experience   0.0186  0.0000 0.0179 0.0000 0.0166 0.0000 0.0167 0.0000  0.0187 0.0000 0.0180 0.0000 0.0166 0.0000 0.0167 0.0000 
Experience
2  -0.0003  0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000  -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 
Tenure   0.0130  0.0000 0.0083 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000 0.0075 0.0000  0.0131 0.0000 0.0083 0.0000 0.0074 0.0000 0.0075 0.0000 
Tenure
2  -0.0002  0.0000 -0.0001 0.0330 -0.0001 0.0110 -0.0001 0.0050  -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0330 -0.0001 0.0110 -0.0001 0.0050 
Education  0.0543  0.0000 0.0420 0.0000 0.0239 0.0000   0.0544 0.0000 0.0421 0.0000 0.0240 0.0000  
Middle school    0.0203 0.1170  0.0211 0.1010 
Secondary school    0.0974 0.0000  0.0986 0.0000 
First degree or above    0.2715 0.0000  0.2730 0.0000 
Female  -0.0906  0.0000 -0.0976 0.0000 -0.1143 0.0000 -0.1156 0.0000  -0.0904 0.0000 -0.0979 0.0000 -0.1143 0.0000 -0.1156 0.0000 
Married   0.0964  0.0000 0.0822 0.0000 0.0760 0.0000 0.0749 0.0000  0.0952 0.0000 0.0812 0.0000 0.0752 0.0000 0.0742 0.0000 
North  0.0381  0.0020 0.0401 0.0010 0.0293 0.0070 0.0258 0.0150  0.0221 0.0470 0.0253 0.0270 0.0186 0.0890 0.0168 0.1200 
South  -0.0007 0.9690 -0.0075 0.6570 -0.0176 0.2900 -0.0227 0.1770  -0.0057 0.7400 -0.0127 0.4250 -0.0219 0.1720 -0.0262 0.1050 
Year 1998  -0.0148 0.1950 0.0018 0.8680 0.0110 0.3150 0.0133 0.2200  -0.0145 0.2060 0.0021 0.8510 0.0112 0.3090 0.0134 0.2160 
Year 2000  -0.0319  0.0020 -0.0111 0.3160 -0.0026 0.8340 0.0006 0.9580  -0.0315 0.0020 -0.0108 0.3310 -0.0024 0.8460 0.0008 0.9470 
Year 2002  -0.0215 0.1190 0.0020 0.8800 0.0155 0.2630 0.0195 0.1600  -0.0216 0.1170 0.0019 0.8870 0.0154 0.2650 0.0194 0.1620 
LLM unemployment rate  -0.0035  0.0010 -0.0036 0.0000 -0.0036 0.0000 -0.0037 0.0000  -0.0039 0.0000 -0.0040 0.0000 -0.0039 0.0000 -0.0039 0.0000 
Part-time    0.0210 0.2550 0.0333 0.0640 0.0349 0.0480 0.0211 0.2510 0.0333 0.0630 0.0350 0.0470 
SME    -0.1328 0.0000 -0.1264 0.0000 -0.1286 0.0000  -0.1319 0.0000 -0.1258 0.0000 -0.1281 0.0000 
Industrial sector    0.0781 0.0000 0.0894 0.0000 0.0988 0.0000  0.0756 0.0000 0.0875 0.0000 0.0972 0.0000 
Building sector    0.0430 0.0500 0.0438 0.0270 0.0477 0.0140  0.0410 0.0610 0.0425 0.0320 0.0466 0.0170 
Trade sector    0.0507 0.0040 0.0493 0.0030 0.0596 0.0000  0.0484 0.0060 0.0477 0.0040 0.0582 0.0000 
Transportation sector    0.1172 0.0000 0.1063 0.0000 0.1159 0.0000  0.1152 0.0000 0.1050 0.0000 0.1147 0.0000 
Banking and insurance    0.2532 0.0000 0.2181 0.0000 0.2301 0.0000  0.2503 0.0000 0.2160 0.0000 0.2283 0.0000 
Real estate sector    0.0802 0.0000 0.0567 0.0080 0.0654 0.0020  0.0778 0.0000 0.0551 0.0090 0.0640 0.0020 
Public sector    0.1547 0.0000 0.0907 0.0000 0.1004 0.0000  0.1543 0.0000 0.0906 0.0000 0.1003 0.0000 
Teacher    0.0000 0.3604 0.0000 0.3842 0.0000  0.3591 0.0000 0.3831 0.0000 
Office worker    0.1080 0.0000 0.1370 0.0000  0.1078 0.0000 0.1367 0.0000 
Worker supervisor    0.2484 0.0000 0.2729 0.0000  0.2492 0.0000 0.2735 0.0000 
Manager     0.4738 0.0000 0.4885 0.0000  0.4733 0.0000 0.4881 0.0000 
Constant   0.8209  0.0000 0.9752 0.0000 1.1431 0.0000 1.3156 0.0000  0.8299 0.0000 0.9854 0.0000 1.1502 0.0000 1.3215 0.0000 
Observations  22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 
R





Table 5 (continued) 
URBAN WAGE PREMIUM (OLS estimates) 
Large city  LLM employment density and large city  Dependent variable:  
logarithm of wage  (5.9)  (5.10) (5.11) (5.12) (5.13) (5.14) (5.15) (5.16) 
  Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
LLM employment density      0.0521 0.0020 0.0440 0.0040 0.0282 0.0490 0.0228 0.1080 
Large  city  0.0250  0.0290 0.0256 0.0120 0.0198 0.0180 0.0171 0.0360  0.0049 0.6860 0.0088 0.4420 0.0091 0.3950 0.0085 0.4210 
Experience   0.0187  0.0000 0.0179 0.0000 0.0166 0.0000 0.0167 0.0000  0.0187 0.0000 0.0179 0.0000 0.0166 0.0000 0.0167 0.0000 
Experience
2  -0.0003  0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000  -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 
Tenure   0.0130  0.0000 0.0083 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000 0.0075 0.0000  0.0131 0.0000 0.0083 0.0000 0.0074 0.0000 0.0075 0.0000 
Tenure
2  -0.0002  0.0000 -0.0001 0.0340 -0.0001 0.0110 -0.0001 0.0060  -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0340 -0.0001 0.0110 -0.0001 0.0060 
Education  0.0543  0.0000 0.0420 0.0000 0.0238 0.0000   0.0543 0.0000 0.0420 0.0000 0.0239 0.0000  
Middle school    0.0201 0.1190  0.0208 0.1050 
Secondary school    0.0971 0.0000  0.0982 0.0000 
First degree or above    0.2715 0.0000  0.2721 0.0000 
Female  -0.0907  0.0000 -0.0976 0.0000 -0.1142 0.0000 -0.1155 0.0000  -0.0905 0.0000 -0.0979 0.0000 -0.1144 0.0000 -0.1156 0.0000 
Married   0.0959  0.0000 0.0819 0.0000 0.0758 0.0000 0.0747 0.0000  0.0954 0.0000 0.0814 0.0000 0.0755 0.0000 0.0745 0.0000 
North  0.0317  0.0070 0.0340 0.0040 0.0247 0.0220 0.0219 0.0370  0.0229 0.0520 0.0267 0.0250 0.0201 0.0750 0.0182 0.1040 
South  -0.0104 0.5420 -0.0163 0.2960 -0.0240 0.1310 -0.0278 0.0830 -0.0054 0.7530 -0.0121 0.4390 -0.0213 0.1780 -0.0257 0.1090 
Year 1998  -0.0151 0.1860 0.0016 0.8880 0.0108 0.3240 0.0131 0.2260  -0.0145 0.2050 0.0020 0.8540 0.0111 0.3100 0.0133 0.2170 
Year 2000  -0.0321  0.0020 -0.0113 0.3140 -0.0027 0.8280 0.0005 0.9630  -0.0315 0.0020 -0.0108 0.3300 -0.0024 0.8450 0.0008 0.9480 
Year 2002  -0.0220 0.1120 0.0017 0.9030 0.0152 0.2720 0.0193 0.1650  -0.0216 0.1160 0.0019 0.8900 0.0153 0.2670 0.0193 0.1630 
LLM unemployment rate  -0.0033  0.0020 -0.0034 0.0000 -0.0035 0.0000 -0.0037 0.0000  -0.0039 0.0000 -0.0040 0.0000 -0.0038 0.0000 -0.0039 0.0000 
Part-time    0.0197 0.2880 0.0324 0.0720 0.0341 0.0540 0.0207 0.2590 0.0330 0.0650 0.0346 0.0490 
SME    -0.1327 0.0000 -0.1263 0.0000 -0.1285 0.0000  -0.1320 0.0000 -0.1258 0.0000 -0.1282 0.0000 
Industrial sector    0.0776 0.0000 0.0889 0.0000 0.0984 0.0000  0.0758 0.0000 0.0877 0.0000 0.0974 0.0000 
Building sector    0.0423 0.0540 0.0433 0.0290 0.0473 0.0150  0.0411 0.0620 0.0426 0.0330 0.0467 0.0170 
Trade sector    0.0496 0.0050 0.0484 0.0040 0.0589 0.0000  0.0484 0.0060 0.0477 0.0040 0.0582 0.0000 
Transportation sector    0.1177 0.0000 0.1066 0.0000 0.1161 0.0000  0.1151 0.0000 0.1050 0.0000 0.1147 0.0000 
Banking and insurance    0.2541 0.0000 0.2184 0.0000 0.2304 0.0000  0.2506 0.0000 0.2165 0.0000 0.2288 0.0000 
Real estate sector    0.0788 0.0000 0.0554 0.0090 0.0643 0.0020  0.0773 0.0000 0.0547 0.0100 0.0637 0.0030 
Public sector    0.1543 0.0000 0.0904 0.0000 0.1001 0.0000  0.1543 0.0000 0.0907 0.0000 0.1003 0.0000 
Teacher     0.3604 0.0000 0.3840 0.0000  0.9845 0.0000 0.3593 0.0000 0.3833 0.0000 
Office worker    0.1083 0.0000 0.1372 0.0000  0.0778 0.0000 0.1076 0.0000 0.1365 0.0000 
Worker supervisor    0.2499 0.0000 0.2739 0.0000  0.2486 0.0000 0.2730 0.0000 
Manager     0.4744 0.0000 0.4887 0.0000  0.4731 0.0000 0.4879 0.0000 
Constant   0.8254  0.0000 0.9801 0.0000 1.1469 0.0000 1.3188 0.0000  0.8294 0.0000 0.1543 0.0000 1.1493 0.0000 1.3204 0.0000 
Observations  22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 
R
2  .3286 .3711 .4057 4042 .3292 .3715 .4059 .4044 





URBAN WAGE PREMIUM USING DIFFERENT PERCENTILES (OLS estimates) 
LLM population level  LLM employment density  Dependent variable: 
logarithm of wage  (6.1) (6.2) (6.3) (6.4) (6.5) (6.6) (6.7) (6.8)  (6.9) 
 75
th percentile  90
th percentile  95
th percentile  99
th  percentile HH-HL 75
th percentile  90
th percentile  95
th percentile  99
th percentile 
Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef.  p-value 
LLM percentiles  0.0214 0.0070 0.0189 0.0230 0.0155 0.0920 0.0301 0.0000   0.0161 0.0500 0.0214 0.0170 0.0266 0.0240 0.0459  0.0020 
HH     0.0180  0.1850    
HL     0.0213  0.0470    
Experience   0.0165 0.0000 0.0166 0.0000 0.0166 0.0000 0.0166 0.0000 0.0166 0.0000 0.0166 0.0000 0.0166 0.0000 0.0166 0.0000 0.0166  0.0000 
Experience
2  -0.0003 0.0000  -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003  0.0000 
Tenure   0.0074 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000 0.0074 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000 0.0074 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000 0.0074  0.0000 
Tenure
2  -0.0001 0.0100  -0.0001 0.0110 -0.0001 0.0110 -0.0001 0.0110 -0.0001 0.0110 -0.0001 0.0100 -0.0001 0.0110 -0.0001 0.0110 -0.0001  0.0110 
Education  0.0238 0.0000 0.0239 0.0000 0.0239 0.0000 0.0239 0.0000 0.0238 0.0000 0.0239 0.0000 0.0239 0.0000 0.0240 0.0000 0.0240  0.0000 
Female  -0.1140 0.0000  -0.1142 0.0000 -0.1142 0.0000 -0.1141 0.0000 -0.1142 0.0000 -0.1139 0.0000 -0.1143 0.0000 -0.1143 0.0000 -0.1140  0.0000 
Married   0.0759 0.0000 0.0758 0.0000 0.0757 0.0000 0.0759 0.0000 0.0759 0.0000 0.0754 0.0000 0.0757 0.0000 0.0751 0.0000 0.0746  0.0000 
North  0.0225 0.0350 0.0246 0.0220 0.0259 0.0190 0.0296 0.0050 0.0253 0.0250 0.0228 0.0370 0.0244 0.0210 0.0174 0.1460 0.0191  0.0920 
South  -0.0266 0.0870  -0.0246 0.1210 -0.0243 0.1350 -0.0179 0.2760 -0.0230 0.1690 -0.0221 0.1750 -0.0188 0.2600 -0.0256 0.1250 -0.0283  0.0840 
Year 1998  0.0109 0.3220 0.0108 0.3240 0.0108 0.3260 0.0110 0.3140 0.0108 0.3240 0.0108 0.3270 0.0110 0.3150 0.0110 0.3160 0.0111  0.3080 
Year 2000  -0.0027 0.8280  -0.0026 0.8310 -0.0028 0.8210 -0.0026 0.8340 -0.0027 0.8260 -0.0028 0.8180 -0.0026 0.8300 -0.0025 0.8380 -0.0023  0.8490 
Year 2002  0.0152 0.2730 0.0153 0.2690 0.0153 0.2680 0.0155 0.2630 0.0153 0.2720 0.0154 0.2640 0.0153 0.2710 0.0153 0.2680 0.0152  0.2700 
LLM unempl. rate  -0.0034 0.0000  -0.0035 0.0000 -0.0034 0.0000 -0.0036 0.0000 -0.0036 0.0000 -0.0036 0.0000 -0.0038 0.0000 -0.0038 0.0000 -0.0033  0.0000 
Part-time   0.0326 0.0710 0.0324 0.0720 0.0329 0.0680 0.0335 0.0620 0.0324 0.0730 0.0325 0.0710 0.0339 0.0590 0.0335 0.0610 0.0333  0.0630 
SME  -0.1262 0.0000  -0.1262 0.0000 -0.1262 0.0000 -0.1266 0.0000 -0.1263 0.0000 -0.1264 0.0000 -0.1263 0.0000 -0.1255 0.0000 -0.1252  0.0000 
Industrial sector  0.0885 0.0000 0.0889 0.0000 0.0891 0.0000 0.0895 0.0000 0.0890 0.0000 0.0889 0.0000 0.0890 0.0000 0.0877 0.0000 0.0893  0.0000 
Building sector  0.0428 0.0320 0.0432 0.0290 0.0436 0.0270 0.0439 0.0260 0.0433 0.0290 0.0426 0.0310 0.0433 0.0290 0.0426 0.0310 0.0444  0.0220 
Trade sector  0.0479 0.0040 0.0483 0.0040 0.0485 0.0030 0.0494 0.0030 0.0484 0.0040 0.0484 0.0030 0.0489 0.0030 0.0477 0.0040 0.0492  0.0030 
Transportation sector  0.1068 0.0000 0.1067 0.0000 0.1068 0.0000 0.1064 0.0000 0.1065 0.0000 0.1068 0.0000 0.1068 0.0000 0.1061 0.0000 0.1071  0.0000 
Banking and insur.  0.2184 0.0000 0.2184 0.0000 0.2184 0.0000 0.2174 0.0000 0.2185 0.0000 0.2183 0.0000 0.2176 0.0000 0.2163 0.0000 0.2166  0.0000 
Real estate sector  0.0549 0.0100 0.0555 0.0090 0.0563 0.0080 0.0573 0.0070 0.0555 0.0080 0.0562 0.0080 0.0563 0.0080 0.0553 0.0090 0.0571  0.0070 
Public sector  0.0899 0.0000 0.0902 0.0000 0.0903 0.0000 0.0906 0.0000 0.0903 0.0000 0.0902 0.0000 0.0905 0.0000 0.0904 0.0000 0.0922  0.0000 
Teacher   0.3597 0.0000 0.3604 0.0000 0.3606 0.0000 0.3602 0.0000 0.3606 0.0000 0.3601 0.0000 0.3604 0.0000 0.3595 0.0000 0.3590  0.0000 
Office worker  0.1079 0.0000 0.1083 0.0000 0.1086 0.0000 0.1082 0.0000 0.1083 0.0000 0.1085 0.0000 0.1088 0.0000 0.1088 0.0000 0.1079  0.0000 
Worker supervisor  0.2494 0.0000 0.2501 0.0000 0.2506 0.0000 0.2489 0.0000 0.2498 0.0000 0.2506 0.0000 0.2500 0.0000 0.2512 0.0000 0.2503  0.0000 
Manager   0.4741 0.0000 0.4744 0.0000 0.4745 0.0000 0.4741 0.0000 0.4745 0.0000 0.4750 0.0000 0.4747 0.0000 0.4746 0.0000 0.4734  0.0000 
Constant   1.1452 0.0000 1.1469 0.0000 1.1469 0.0000 1.1446 0.0000 1.1470 0.0000 1.1470 0.0000 1.1490 0.0000 1.1557 0.0000 1.1489  0.0000 
Observations  22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996  22,996 
R
2  .4058 .4057 .4055 .4058 .4057 .4056 .4056 .4056  .4059 





URBAN WAGE PREMIUM (instrumental variable and OLS estimates) 
Ability sub-sample  Ability sub-sample  IV on education   Dependent 
var: log wages  (7.1) (7.2) (7.3) (7.4) (7.5) (7.6) (7.7) (7.8) (7.9) (7.10)  (7.11)  (7.12) 
 Coef. p-value Coef.  p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
LLM population    0.0048 0.3640    0.0056 0.2850   0.0092 0.0100   
LLM empl. den   0.0122 0.5680  -0.0080 0.7950 0.0132 0.5360   -0.0066 0.8320 0.0468 0.0000 0.0550  0.0010 
Large city       0.0167 0.3060 0.0196 0.3820 0.0168  0.2990 0.0193 0.3910 0.0130 0.2100 -0.0078 0.5070 
Experience   0.0192 0.0000  0.0191  0.0000  0.0192 0.0000 0.0192 0.0000 0.0192 0.0000 0.0191 0.0000 0.0191  0.0000 0.0191 0.0000 0.0187 0.0000 0.0187 0.0000 0.0188 0.0000 0.0188  0.0000 
Experience
2  -0.0004 0.0000  -0.0004  0.0000 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0004  0.0000 -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002  0.0000 
Tenure   0.0077 0.0520  0.0077  0.0500  0.0077 0.0530 0.0077 0.0530 0.0074 0.0620 0.0074 0.0590 0.0074  0.0620 0.0074 0.0630 0.0076 0.0000 0.0076 0.0000 0.0076 0.0000 0.0076  0.0000 
Tenure
2 0.0000 0.8970  0.0000  0.8930  0.0000 0.8950 0.0000 0.8910 0.0000 0.9710 0.0000 0.9640 0.0000  0.9650 0.0000 0.9620 -0.0001 0.0190 -0.0001 0.0200 -0.0001 0.0190 -0.0001  0.0200 
Education  0.0373 0.0000  0.0375  0.0000  0.0371 0.0000 0.0372 0.0000 0.0344 0.0000 0.0347 0.0000 0.0344  0.0000 0.0344 0.0000 0.0503 0.0000 -0.1115 0.0000 -0.1111 0.0000 -0.1114  0.0000 
Female  -0.1024 0.0000  -0.1023  0.0000 -0.1027 0.0000 -0.1027 0.0000 -0.1036 0.0000 -0.1034 0.0000 -0.1038  0.0000 -0.1038 0.0000 -0.1113 0.0000 0.0502 0.0000 0.0505 0.0000 0.0504  0.0000 
Married   0.0841 0.0000  0.0836  0.0000  0.0846 0.0000 0.0847 0.0000 0.0857 0.0000 0.0851 0.0000 0.0861  0.0000 0.0861 0.0000 0.0733 0.0000 0.0726 0.0000 0.0729 0.0000 0.0723  0.0000 
North         0.0341 0.0040 0.0221 0.0500 0.0301 0.0090 0.0210  0.0720 
South         -0.0043 0.8280 -0.0056 0.7520 -0.0115 0.5350 -0.0060  0.7320 
Year 1998  0.0088 0.6380  0.0046  0.8270  0.0063 0.7420 0.0077 0.7280 0.0098 0.6000 0.0052 0.8080 0.0070  0.7160 0.0082 0.7140    
Year 2000  0.0101 0.7160  0.0069  0.7930  0.0088 0.7380 0.0081 0.7660 0.0114 0.6850 0.0074 0.7800 0.0092  0.7290 0.0086 0.7530    
Year 2002  0.0110 0.4510  0.0109  0.4550  0.0109 0.4550 0.0109 0.4540 0.0101 0.4910 0.0100 0.4950 0.0100  0.4940 0.0100 0.4940 0.0025 0.8210 0.0022 0.8430 0.0022 0.8430 0.0021 0.8480 
Unemploy.rate -0.0050 0.0120  -0.0050  0.0140 -0.0051 0.0110 -0.0050 0.0170 -0.0050 0.0130 -0.0050 0.0150 -0.0051  0.0110 -0.0050 0.0170 -0.0035 0.0030 -0.0039 0.0010 -0.0033 0.0050 -0.0039  0.0000 
Part-time   -0.0267 0.4500  -0.0269  0.4450 -0.0270 0.4440 -0.0272 0.4380 -0.0256 0.4650 -0.0260 0.4580 -0.0261  0.4560 -0.0263 0.4510 0.0482 0.0080 0.0484 0.0080 0.0474 0.0100 0.0487  0.0070 
SME  -0.1208 0.0000  -0.1201  0.0000 -0.1207 0.0000 -0.1209 0.0000 -0.1197 0.0000 -0.1189 0.0000 -0.1196  0.0000 -0.1197 0.0000 -0.1175 0.0000 -0.1167 0.0000 -0.1174 0.0000 -0.1165  0.0000 
Industry  0.1374 0.0000  0.1375  0.0000  0.1375 0.0000 0.1377 0.0000 0.1366 0.0000 0.1368 0.0000 0.1368  0.0000 0.1369 0.0000 0.0759 0.0000 0.0740 0.0000 0.0757 0.0000 0.0736  0.0000 
Building sector  0.0232 0.6200  0.0234  0.6160  0.0231 0.6210 0.0231 0.6210 0.0215 0.6460 0.0219 0.6400 0.0215  0.6460 0.0215 0.6450 0.0363 0.0830 0.0350 0.0930 0.0358 0.0900 0.0349  0.0930 
Trade sector  0.1110 0.0020  0.1107  0.0020  0.1100 0.0020 0.1097 0.0020 0.1097 0.0020 0.1093 0.0020 0.1087  0.0030 0.1084 0.0030 0.0370 0.0460 0.0354 0.0550 0.0362 0.0500 0.0352  0.0570 
Transport. sect  0.1227 0.0180  0.1235  0.0170  0.1219 0.0190 0.1222 0.0180 0.1227 0.0170 0.1236 0.0160 0.1222  0.0170 0.1224 0.0170 0.1107 0.0000 0.1087 0.0000 0.1112 0.0000 0.1086  0.0000 
Banking   0.2657 0.0000  0.2655  0.0000  0.2662 0.0000 0.2666 0.0000 0.2650 0.0000 0.2648 0.0000 0.2656  0.0000 0.2660 0.0000 0.1801 0.0000 0.1780 0.0000 0.1800 0.0000 0.1772  0.0000 
Real estate   0.1437 0.0000  0.1438  0.0000  0.1430 0.0000 0.1429 0.0000 0.1435 0.0000 0.1436 0.0000 0.1429  0.0000 0.1428 0.0000 0.0335 0.1130 0.0317 0.1290 0.0326 0.1170 0.0318 0.1250 
Public sector  0.1071 0.0180  0.1079  0.0170  0.1076 0.0170 0.1073 0.0180 0.1063 0.0190 0.1073 0.0190 0.1069  0.0190 0.1066 0.0190 0.0663 0.0000 0.0671 0.0000 0.0657 0.0000 0.0670  0.0000 
Teacher   0.2895 0.0000  0.2889  0.0000  0.2893 0.0000 0.2897 0.0000 0.2866 0.0000 0.2861 0.0000 0.2866  0.0000 0.2869 0.0000 0.1959 0.0000 0.1958 0.0000 0.1951 0.0000 0.1942  0.0000 
Office worker  0.1268 0.0000  0.1271  0.0000  0.1264 0.0000 0.1268 0.0000 0.1272 0.0000 0.1277 0.0000 0.1271  0.0000 0.1274 0.0000 0.0295 0.0770 0.0294 0.0760 0.0297 0.0780 0.0289  0.0850 
Worker superv.  0.2837 0.0000  0.2847  0.0000  0.2831 0.0000 0.2838 0.0000 0.2818 0.0000 0.2833 0.0000 0.2818  0.0000 0.2824 0.0000 0.1291 0.0000 0.1295 0.0000 0.1306 0.0000 0.1290  0.0000 
Manager  0.4859 0.0000  0.4857  0.0000  0.4856 0.0000 0.4862 0.0000 0.4799 0.0000 0.4799 0.0000 0.4800  0.0000 0.4805 0.0000 0.2787 0.0000 0.2789 0.0000 0.2790 0.0000 0.2774  0.0000 
Mark         -0.0007 0.9930 0.0002 0.9980 -0.0020  0.9820 -0.0021 0.9810   
Laude       0.0712 0.0310 0.0701 0.0320 0.0700  0.0320 0.0699 0.0330   
Constant   0.9115 0.0000  0.9120  0.0000  0.9143 0.0000 0.9130 0.0000 0.9502 0.0000 0.9496 0.0000 0.9524  0.0000 0.9512 0.0000 0.8678 0.0000 0.8769 0.0000 0.8699 0.0000 0.8754  0.0000 
Observations  5,314 5,314 5,314 5,314 5,314 5,314 5,314 5,314 19,310  19,310  19,310  19,310   
R
2  .3797 .3797 .3799 .3799 .3807 .3806 .3808 .3808 .4055 .4061 .4050 .4058   
Notes: Regressions are weighted to population proportions and White-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the LLM level. The variables used to instrument education in 





SENSITIVITY CHECKS ON URBAN WAGE PREMIUM (OLS estimates) 
Regional fixed effects  Centre-North sub-sample  South sub-sample  Dep. variable: 
log of wage  (8.1) (8.2) (8.3) (8.4) (8.5) (8.6) (8.7) (8.8) (8.9) (8.10)  (8.11)  (8.12) 
 Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef.  p-value 
LLM population  0.0111 0.0070    0.0095 0.0260   0.0189 0.0100    
LLM empl. den  0.0290 0.0540  0.0016 0.9320 0.0521 0.0000   0.0554 0.0010 0.0271 0.3700 -0.0039  0.9010 
Large city      0.0229 0.0050 0.0223 0.0400 0.0211 0.0600 -0.0033 0.7930 0.0294 0.0680 0.0306  0.0960 
Experience   0.0166 0.0000 0.0167 0.0000 0.0166 0.0000 0.0166 0.0000 0.0152 0.0000 0.0152 0.0000 0.0152 0.0000 0.0152 0.0000 0.0174 0.0000 0.0175 0.0000 0.0174 0.0000 0.0174 0.0000 
Experience
2  -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000  -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0002 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0003 0.0000 
Tenure   0.0072 0.0000 0.0072 0.0000 0.0072 0.0000 0.0072 0.0000 0.0082 0.0000 0.0082 0.0000 0.0082 0.0000 0.0082 0.0000 0.0073 0.0030 0.0074 0.0020 0.0073 0.0030 0.0073 0.0030 
Tenure
2  -0.0001 0.0130 -0.0001 0.0130  -0.0001 0.0140 -0.0001 0.0140 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 -0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.7190 0.0000 0.6990 0.0000 0.7300 0.0000 0.7310 
Education  0.0241 0.0000 0.0242 0.0000 0.0241 0.0000 0.0241 0.0000 0.0235 0.0000 0.0236 0.0000 0.0235 0.0000 0.0236 0.0000 0.0236 0.0000 0.0235 0.0000 0.0235 0.0000 0.0235 0.0000 
Female  -0.1144 0.0000 -0.1141 0.0000  -0.1144 0.0000 -0.1144 0.0000 -0.1157 0.0000 -0.1159 0.0000 -0.1156 0.0000 -0.1159 0.0000 -0.1189 0.0000 -0.1189 0.0000 -0.1190 0.0000 -0.1190 0.0000 
Valle d’Aosta  0.0378 0.0040 0.0393 0.0040 0.0403 0.0050 0.0405 0.0050     
Lombardy  0.0288 0.0470 0.0270 0.0610 0.0325 0.0270 0.0322 0.0400     
Trentino  0.0732 0.0000 0.0731 0.0000 0.0759 0.0000 0.0760 0.0000     
Veneto  -0.0172 0.2760 -0.0177 0.2620  -0.0221 0.1840 -0.0219 0.1960     
Friuli VG  0.0190 0.3510 0.0183 0.3340 0.0234 0.2640 0.0234 0.2630     
Liguria  -0.0225 0.3030 -0.0214 0.3230  -0.0273 0.2730 -0.0270 0.2820     
Emilia Romag.  0.0180 0.2840 0.0176 0.3020 0.0190 0.2640 0.0190 0.2630     
Tuscany  0.0328 0.0270 0.0338 0.0240 0.0331 0.0430 0.0333 0.0440     
Umbria  -0.0853 0.0010 -0.0838 0.0010  -0.0821 0.0020 -0.0819 0.0020     
Marche  -0.0572 0.0040 -0.0585 0.0030  -0.0546 0.0070 -0.0546 0.0070     
Lazio  -0.0416 0.0090 -0.0229 0.2240  -0.0303 0.0850 -0.0300 0.0970     
Abruzzo  -0.0358 0.2080 -0.0354 0.2190  -0.0329 0.2530 -0.0328 0.2550     
Molise  -0.0339 0.3350 -0.0308 0.3860  -0.0314 0.3780 -0.0311 0.3860     
Campania  -0.0734 0.0270 -0.0709 0.0330  -0.0687 0.0420 -0.0687 0.0420     
Puglia  -0.0489 0.0090 -0.0417 0.0280  -0.0529 0.0100 -0.0523 0.0140     
Basilicata  -0.0776 0.2640 -0.0735 0.2910  -0.0752 0.2800 -0.0748 0.2830     
Calabria  -0.0842 0.0360 -0.0801 0.0500  -0.0807 0.0490 -0.0803 0.0520     
Sicily  -0.0767 0.0130 -0.0721 0.0240  -0.0768 0.0130 -0.0763 0.0140     
Sardinia  -0.0075 0.8430 -0.0032 0.9330  -0.0066 0.8630 -0.0062 0.8740     
Constant  1.1461 0.0000 1.1448 0.0000 1.1449 0.0000 1.1448 0.0000 1.1917 0.0000 1.1813 0.0000 1.1903 0.0000 1.1806 0.0000 1.1779 0.0000 1.1816 0.0000 1.1728 0.0000 1.1716 0.0000 
Observations 
22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 16,058 16,058 16,058 16,058  6,938  6,938  6,938  6,938 
R
2 
.4089 .4087 .4090 .4090 .4041 .4050 .4041 .4050 .4235 .4230  .4234  .4234 
Notes: Regressions are weighted to population proportions and White-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the LLM level. The other control variables, not reported here for 




URBAN WAGE STRUCTURE (OLS estimates) (it continues) 
LLM population level  LLM employment density  Dependent variable:  
logarithm of wage  (9.1) (9.2) (9.3) (9.4) (9.5) (9.6) (9.7) (9.8) 
  Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
LLM population level  0.0540 0.1630 0.0163 0.6230 0.0105 0.7170 -0.0009 0.9740    
LLM employment density      0.2077 0.0950 0.1094 0.3550 0.1020 0.3620 0.0392 0.7020 
Experience *A  0.0016  0.0860 0.0018 0.0210 0.0013 0.0820 0.0014 0.0650  0.0058 0.0610 0.0059 0.0380 0.0043 0.1290 0.0045  0.1000 
Experience
2 *A  0.0000 0.1190 0.0000 0.0640 0.0000 0.1340 0.0000 0.1180  -0.0001 0.0950 -0.0001 0.1390 -0.0001 0.2760 -0.0001 0.2860 
Tenure *A  -0.0014  0.0190 -0.0012 0.0810 -0.0016 0.0250 -0.0017 0.0110  -0.0079 0.0290 -0.0067 0.0420 -0.0076 0.0670 -0.0083  0.0460 
Tenure
2 *A  0.0000 0.4270 0.0000 0.8120 0.0000 0.2530 0.0000 0.1290 0.0002 0.0850 0.0001 0.2140 0.0002 0.0750 0.0002  0.0390 
Education *A  -0.0012 0.2020 -0.0007 0.5610 -0.0018 0.0240  -0.0041 0.3060 -0.0007 0.8690 -0.0044 0.1960    
Middle school *A   -0.0018 0.8260  0.0102  0.7310 
Secondary school *A   -0.0099 0.5150  -0.0080  0.8660 
First degree or above *A    -0.0351 0.0030  -0.0893  0.0310 
Female *A  -0.0140  0.0830 -0.0107 0.1170 -0.0089 0.0530 -0.0094 0.0430 -0.0630 0.0080 -0.0546 0.0040 -0.0345 0.0600 -0.0363  0.0450 
Married *A  -0.0001 0.9920 0.0029 0.7550 0.0061 0.4500 0.0060 0.4650 0.0023 0.9250 0.0264 0.3140 0.0265 0.2800 0.0295 0.2450 
North *A  -0.0020 0.8690 -0.0082 0.4660 -0.0023 0.8290 -0.0018 0.8580  -0.0647 0.3090 -0.1041 0.1260 -0.0923 0.1770 -0.0727 0.2810 
South *A  0.0489 0.1900 0.0542 0.0970 0.0313 0.3210 0.0259 0.3900 -0.0595 0.6130 -0.0817 0.4590 -0.1423 0.2000 -0.1633  0.1420 
Year 1998 *A  0.0164  0.0800 0.0134 0.1740 0.0143 0.1690 0.0134 0.1980 0.0363 0.3500 0.0190 0.6190 0.0169 0.6880 0.0146 0.7270 
Year 2000 *A  0.0109 0.1980 0.0157 0.1530 0.0170 0.2210 0.0145 0.2860 0.0354 0.2160 0.0220 0.5190 0.0081 0.8680 0.0021 0.9640 
Year 2002 *A  -0.0005 0.9520 0.0002 0.9830 -0.0034 0.7650 -0.0044 0.6970  -0.0033 0.9120 -0.0044 0.8940 -0.0220 0.6150 -0.0257 0.5600 
LLM unemploym.t rate*A  -0.0025 0.2750 -0.0029 0.1450 -0.0014 0.4490 -0.0012 0.5060  -0.0020 0.7360 -0.0024 0.6500 0.0017 0.7460 0.0036 0.4890 
Part-time *A   -0.0050 0.8710 -0.0057 0.8390 -0.0066 0.8090  -0.0735 0.3320 -0.0673 0.3370 -0.0679  0.3140 
SME *A   0.0153 0.1920 0.0190 0.0940 0.0182 0.1050  0.0701 0.0590 0.0617 0.1050 0.0554 0.1420 
Industrial sector *A    0.0254 0.0860 0.0130 0.3350 0.0085 0.5280 0.0253 0.6250 0.0046 0.9180 -0.0108  0.7980 
Building sector *A   0.0004 0.9860 -0.0099 0.5900 -0.0130 0.4780  -0.0633 0.2790 -0.0624 0.1580 -0.0713  0.0920 
Trade sector *A   0.0095 0.3330 -0.0052 0.5830 -0.0099 0.2980  0.0495 0.2090 0.0221 0.5550 0.0052  0.8920 
Transportation sector*A   0.0176 0.2850 -0.0011 0.9460 -0.0074 0.6390  0.0303 0.6900 -0.0021 0.9750 -0.0201  0.7600 
Banking and insurance*A   0.0028 0.8560 -0.0173 0.2460 -0.0192 0.2390  -0.0274 0.6190 -0.0674 0.1950 -0.0780  0.1350 
Real estate sector *A    0.0396 0.0000 0.0263 0.0150 0.0229 0.0320  0.1392 0.0310 0.1091 0.0980 0.1002 0.1180 
Public sector *A    0.0284 0.0260 0.0232 0.0330 0.0191 0.0780 0.0614 0.3460 0.0658 0.0930 0.0539 0.1510 
Teacher *A   0.0027 0.9360 0.0072 0.8280  -0.0790 0.5350 -0.0553  0.6460 
Office worker*A    0.0130 0.0290 0.0126 0.0100 0.0340 0.1430 0.0331  0.0960 
Worker supervisor *A    0.0487 0.0050 0.0514 0.0020  0.1699 0.0020 0.1817  0.0020 
Manager  *A   0.0038 0.9260 0.0109 0.7920  0.1350 0.0190 0.1647  0.0080 
Constant   0.8103 0.0000 0.9947 0.0000 1.1555 0.0000 1.3306 0.0000 0.7982 0.0000 0.9809 0.0000 1.1416 0.0000 1.3234 0.0000 
Observations  22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996     
R
2  .3301 .3731 .4082 .4068 .3302 .3733 .4087 .4074     
It continues….    
 
 
Table 9 (continued) 
URBAN WAGE STRUCTURE (OLS estimates) 
Large city  LLM employment density and large city  Dependent variable: 
 logarithm of wage  (9.9)  (9.10) (9.11) (9.12) (9.13) (9.14) (9.15) (9.16) 
  Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
LLM employment density     0.1577 0.3590 0.1096 0.5330 0.0917 0.5890 0.0140 0.9310 
Large  city  0.0562 0.4860 0.0073 0.9150 0.0139 0.8240 0.0100 0.8600 0.0107 0.9180 0.0050 0.9530 -0.0037 0.9650 0.0132 0.8560 
Experience *A  0.0008 0.7920 0.0009 0.7500 0.0003 0.9180 0.0010 0.7120  -0.0026 0.4750 -0.0027 0.4650 -0.0029 0.3780 -0.0021 0.5290 
Experience
2 *A  0.0000 0.4530 0.0000 0.5320 0.0000 0.6160 0.0000 0.5060 0.0000 0.9780 0.0000 0.9940 0.0000 0.9640 0.0000 0.8590 
Tenure *A  0.0000 0.9920 0.0004 0.8720 -0.0004 0.8760 -0.0008 0.7570 0.0051 0.1950 0.0053 0.1670 0.0047 0.2160 0.0045 0.2360 
Tenure
2 *A  0.0000 0.9920 0.0000 0.7890 0.0000 0.7860 0.0000 0.6420  -0.0001 0.2650 -0.0001 0.2500 -0.0001 0.3530 -0.0001 0.4260 
Education *A  -0.0030 0.2980 -0.0016 0.5760 -0.0032 0.1920   -0.0033 0.3760 -0.0027 0.4440 -0.0025 0.4370  
Middle school *A   -0.0197 0.4460  -0.0411 0.1660 
Secondary school *A   -0.0255 0.4790  -0.0409 0.3380 
First degree or above *A    -0.0751 0.0510 -0.0675 0.2040 
Female *A  -0.0168 0.3840 -0.0126 0.4260 -0.0028 0.8460 -0.0039 0.7870 0.0156 0.4180 0.0146 0.3240 0.0171 0.2790 0.0155 0.3320 
Married *A  0.0122 0.5260 0.0143 0.4710 0.0105 0.5420 0.0073 0.6740 0.0191 0.4530 0.0065 0.7960 0.0004 0.9860 -0.0067 0.7420 
North *A  -0.0118 0.6420 -0.0211 0.3810 -0.0119 0.6030 -0.0103 0.6350  -0.0281 0.3740 -0.0214 0.5670 -0.0093 0.8150 -0.0069 0.8590 
South *A  0.0151 0.7000 0.0169 0.6380 0.0074 0.8440 0.0063 0.8650 0.0537 0.2860 0.0693 0.1580 0.0512 0.3500 0.0499 0.3720 
Year 1998 *A  0.0280 0.2240 0.0220 0.3300 0.0226 0.3110 0.0224 0.3120 0.0286 0.1910 0.0288 0.1580 0.0286 0.1800 0.0305 0.1450 
Year 2000 *A  0.0222 0.2370 0.0287 0.2050 0.0283 0.2880 0.0227 0.3830 0.0179 0.3990 0.0399 0.0940 0.0439 0.1070 0.0387 0.1470 
Year 2002 *A  0.0078 0.7680 0.0124 0.6490 0.0095 0.7420 0.0087 0.7650 0.0198 0.5950 0.0260 0.4740 0.0301 0.3990 0.0322 0.3710 
LLM unemploym.t rate*A  -0.0001 0.9590 -0.0008 0.7430 0.0000 0.9990 0.0000 0.9900  -0.0004 0.9000 -0.0018 0.4750 -0.0006 0.8240 -0.0005 0.8680 
Part-time *A   0.0021 0.9620 -0.0004 0.9910 -0.0041 0.9190  0.0568 0.1270 0.0490 0.1780 0.0437 0.2240 
SME *A   0.0090 0.7650 0.0128 0.6830 0.0104 0.7400  -0.0352 0.2790 -0.0250 0.5100 -0.0248 0.5120 
Industrial sector *A   0.0425 0.2270 0.0185 0.5560 0.0082 0.7910  0.0543 0.2380 0.0304 0.4650 0.0235 0.5670 
Building sector *A   -0.0325 0.5150 -0.0396 0.3470 -0.0457 0.2740  -0.0045 0.9440 -0.0149 0.7870 -0.0186 0.7330 
Trade sector *A   0.0256 0.4140 -0.0062 0.8310 -0.0167 0.5610  0.0179 0.6710 -0.0159 0.6760 -0.0236 0.5250 
Transportation sector*A   0.0001 0.9980 -0.0304 0.4580 -0.0404 0.3190  -0.0272 0.6610 -0.0506 0.3490 -0.0556 0.2910 
Banking and insurance*A   -0.0318 0.4130 -0.0747 0.0480 -0.0795 0.0400 -0.0421 0.4220 -0.0773 0.1250 -0.0773 0.1240 
Real estate sector *A    0.0726 0.0730 0.0337 0.4180 0.0234 0.5750 0.0244 0.6040 -0.0144 0.7610 -0.0246 0.5970 
Public sector *A   0.0361 0.3390 0.0329 0.3510 0.0230 0.5050  0.0204 0.7020 0.0177 0.7470 0.0076 0.8860 
Teacher *A   -0.0517 0.3840 -0.0447 0.4560  -0.0418 0.5020 -0.0435 0.5100 
Office worker*A    0.0291 0.0900 0.0254 0.1240 0.0223 0.3200 0.0179 0.3630 
Worker supervisor *A    0.1294 0.0010 0.1300 0.0010  0.0867 0.0100 0.0824 0.0160 
Manager  *A   0.0266 0.6990 0.0387 0.5790  -0.0510 0.4780 -0.0483 0.4780 
It continues… 




Table 9 (continued) 
URBAN WAGE STRUCTURE (OLS estimates) 
Large city  LLM employment density and large city  Dependent variable: 
 logarithm of wage  (9.9)  (9.10) (9.11) (9.12) (9.13) (9.14) (9.15) (9.16) 
  Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value Coef. p-value 
LLM employment density       
Experience *D      0.0085 0.0500 0.0086 0.0370 0.0073 0.0580 0.0068 0.0850 
Experience
2 *D     -0.0001 0.2400 -0.0001 0.3040 -0.0001 0.3830 -0.0001 0.5540 
Tenure *D      -0.0131 0.0220 -0.0121 0.0280 -0.0125 0.0460 -0.0130 0.0390 
Tenure
2 *D      0.0003 0.0390 0.0002 0.0840 0.0002 0.0540 0.0002 0.0480 
Education *D     -0.0008 0.8680 0.0020 0.7200 -0.0020 0.6420  
Middle school *D     0.0508 0.1760 
Secondary school *D     0.0313 0.5810 
First degree or above *D     -0.0249 0.6710 
Female *D      -0.0793 0.0060 -0.0694 0.0010 -0.0518 0.0140 -0.0521 0.0140 
Married  *D     -0.0192 0.5560 0.0179 0.6200 0.0243 0.4520 0.0350 0.2710 
North *D     -0.0296 0.7880 -0.1023 0.4320 -0.0804 0.5490 -0.0673 0.6100 
South *D     -0.1890 0.2140 -0.2092 0.1920 -0.2260 0.1780 -0.2524 0.1300 
Year 1998 *D     0.0080 0.8250 -0.0091 0.7970 -0.0097 0.8180 -0.0143 0.7310 
Year 2000 *D     0.0186 0.5600 -0.0169 0.6240 -0.0339 0.5090 -0.0345 0.4930 
Year 2002 *D     -0.0232 0.6010 -0.0308 0.4990 -0.0517 0.3240 -0.0573 0.2790 
LLM unemploym.t rate*D     0.0025 0.6550 0.0013 0.8010 0.0041 0.4410 0.0060 0.2490 
Part-time *D      -0.1297 0.1020 -0.1160 0.1230 -0.1119 0.1240 
SME *D      0.1054 0.0270 0.0861 0.0960 0.0794 0.1200 
Industrial sector *D     -0.0283 0.6430 -0.0249 0.6580 -0.0329 0.5420 
Building sector *D     -0.0566 0.4980 -0.0466 0.5000 -0.0518 0.4420 
Trade sector *D     0.0319 0.5400 0.0380 0.4340 0.0295 0.5330 
Transportation sector *D     0.0532 0.5860 0.0455 0.6030 0.0338 0.6950 
Banking and insurance*D     0.0064 0.9220 0.0029 0.9660 -0.0060 0.9300 
Real estate sector *D      0.1178 0.1000 0.1252 0.0990 0.1270 0.0860 
Public sector *D     0.0413 0.6130 0.0450 0.4830 0.0449 0.4680 
Teacher *D      -0.0326 0.8260 -0.0078 0.9560 
Office worker *D      0.0112 0.7340 0.0145 0.5540 
Worker supervisor * D     0.0895 0.2540 0.1048 0.1960 
Manager * D      0.1825 0.0170 0.2088 0.0080 
Constant   0.8143 0.0000 0.9885 0.0000 1.1504 0.0000 1.3212 0.0000 0.7980 0.0000 0.9817 0.0000 1.1448 0.0000 1.3236 0.0000 
Observations  22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996 22,996   
R
2  .3291 .3721 .4079 .4065 .3313 .3749 .4105 .4092   
Notes: Regressions are weighted to population proportions and White-robust standard errors adjusted for clustering at the LLM level. The interaction variable “A” (i.e., 
“agglomeration”) is equal to LLM population size in columns (9.1)-(9.4), to LLM employment density in columns (9.5)-(9.8) and (9.13)-(9.16), and to the large city dummy in 
columns (9.9)-(9.12), while the interaction variable “D” in columns (9.13)-(9.16) refers to LLM employment density. The non-interacted variables are not reported for space 
constraints.   
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SPATIAL DISTRIBUTION OF LLM COLLEGE GRADUATES 





















MORAN SCATTERPLOT OF LLM POPULATION 
 
 
Notes: For each LLM, the spatial lag of population is the weighted average of the population in neighboring locations. 
































































The Moran Scatterplot and the Local Moran’s I Statistic 
 
The Moran Scatterplot is a visual device that provides intuition about whether a spatial 
unit (e.g., the LLM) is similar (or dissimilar) to its neighbors in terms of a given variable. 
Figure 4 shows the value of the Italian LLM population on the horizontal axis against its 
spatial lag (i.e., a weighted average of its values in neighboring locations) on the vertical 
axis. The four quadrants of the scatterplot (centered on the mean) correspond to the four 
types of spatial associations between a spatial unit and its neighbors. For instance, the first 
quadrant, HH, contains the areas with a high population value surrounded by zones with high 
values; the second one, LH, contains the areas with a low value surrounded by regions with 
high values, etc. Thus, quadrants HH and LL (LH and HL) indicate positive (negative) 
spatial autocorrelation, showing spatial clustering of similar (dissimilar) values of the LLM 
population. The linear regression's slope coefficient is, under some assumptions, formally 
























where n is the number of observations,  i x  denotes the observation on unit i for the 
variable of interest, x its global (national) average and  ij w  denotes the elements of the 
spatial weights matrix (see Appendix II).   0 S  is a scaling factor equal to the sum of all the 
elements in the weighting matrix. This statistic summarizes the overall pattern in the data, 
indicating whether, in the entire sample, the areas with relatively high or low values of a 
variable (e.g., population) are located close to regions with similar or dissimilar values more 
often than would be observed if their locations were purely random (see, for instance, Cliff 
and Ord (1981) for further details).   
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However, the use of a global statistic does not allow one to assess the presence of 
spatial clusters at the local level. Conversely, the Moran Scatterplot shows the spatial regime 
(position across quadrants) of each location, but it does not indicate whether these local 
spatial associations are significant. This can be detected with local spatial correlation 
statistics (LISA), which are "local versions" of the Moran’s I statistic (Anselin, 1995). The 






















where n is the number of observations,  i x  denotes the observation on unit i for the 
variable of interest, x its global (national) average and  ij w  denotes the elements of the 
spatial weights matrix as before. It follows that the global Moran I is related to the local 








= ∑ . A positive and significant value of the local statistic 
indicates spatial clustering of similar values (high or low) between an area and its neighbors, 
whereas a negative and significant value indicates spatial clustering of dissimilar values. 
Since in order to detect whether an area with a positive (negative) local statistic is in the HH 
or LL (HL or LH) spatial regime it is necessary to look at its position in the Moran 





The spatial association scheme 
 
The specification of the neighborhood set is one of the most delicate methodological 
issues in spatial data analysis, particularly when dealing with areal units on an irregular grid 
(like in Italy).  
The spatial linkages or proximity of the n observations are summarized by defining a 
n×n spatial weighting matrix, W ={ } ij w , where  ij w  = 1 if sites i and j are designated as 
neighbors, and  ij w  = 0 otherwise. Various matrices can be considered.
69 The main 
methodological concern is related to the problems that may occur when the number of 
neighbors is allowed to vary. This problem arises with simple contiguity matrices and with 
distance-based weight matrices, both when using the same fixed distance critical cut-off for 
all areas and when imposing a common distance-decay criterion. This is of particular 
relevance in our study as we deal with Italian LLMs, which are more irregular areal units 
than, for instance, the US States. 
Thus, in our analysis we consider a distance-based spatial weight matrix where the 
critical cut-off is allowed to vary for each area. We use a k-nearest neighbors weight matrix, 
identifying the critical cut-off for each area so as that each area has the same number of 
neighbors (k). 
                                                           
69 A standard approach is to define proximity in terms of contiguity (i.e., areas are designated as neighbors 
if they share a common boundary). Alternatively, a distance-based spatial weighting matrix can be used. In this 
case, the most common choices are to consider areas as neighbors if they are within a specified distance 
threshold value d of each other or to impose a distance decay function, where the weight assigned to each 
observation is inversely related to its importance.  
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The spatial connection between areas is calculated from the great circle distance 
between areas’ centroids.
70  
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where ) (k di  is a critical cut-off distance defined for each region i. More precisely, 
) (k di  is the 
th k  order smallest distance between regions i and j such that each region i has 
exactly  k  neighbors. The matrices are row-standardized so that W(k)={ ) (
* k wij } where 
∑ =
j ij ij ij k w k w k w ) ( ) ( ) (
* . 
 
                                                           
70 Note that measures of proximity based on economic variables (e.g., volume of trade between LLMs or 
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